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DIGITAL BORDER SEARCHES AFTER RILEY v.
CALIFORNIA

Thomas Mann Miller*
Abstract: The federal government claims that the Fourth Amendment permits it to search
digital information on cell phones, laptops, and other electronic devices at the international
border without suspicion of criminal activity, much less a warrant. Until recently, federal
courts have generally permitted these digital border searches, treating them no differently
from searches of luggage. Courts that have limited digital border searches have required only
that the government establish reasonable suspicion for the most exhaustive kind of digital
search. The Supreme Court has not yet weighed in, but last year it held in Riley v. California
that the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement does not apply to cell
phones. This Comment analyzes how Riley affects the border search doctrine and concludes
that it should change the debate in significant ways. First, Riley establishes that digital
searches are categorically different from physical searches. This undermines the first wave of
border search decisions and suggests that courts will have to analyze digital searches
differently. Second, the Court recognized that digital searches could be even more intrusive
than the search of one’s home. This finding weighs in favor of requiring at least reasonable
suspicion, if not probable cause, for digital border searches. Third, the Court provides a test
for determining when to deviate from the warrant requirement in light of new technology.
The Court’s analysis on this question supports reconsidering whether the border search
exception—traditionally applied to searches of persons and physical property—should apply
to searches of digital information.

INTRODUCTION
Despite a variety of important individual interests in digital
information, U.S. border agents seize and search cell phones, laptop
computers, and other electronic devices of people entering and exiting
the country without any suspicion of criminal activity.1 This is pursuant
* The author interned for the American Civil Liberties Union of Northern California in 2014 and
the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of Law in 2015. Both organizations
have taken positions on digital border searches, but the author did not work for either organization
on this issue. The views expressed in this Comment are the author’s alone.
1. U.S. Customs and Border Protection “has often ignored opposing assertions of attorney-client
privilege and Fourth Amendment rights, while pursuing the exercise of its almost unlimited
authority to search for illegal materials.” Robert T. Givens, The Danger of U.S. Customs Searches
for Returning Lawyers, GPSOLO, May/June 2013, at 39, 40, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/publications/gp_solo/2013/may_june/the_danger_us_customs_searches
_returning_lawyers.html. “The best policy [for lawyers] is to have nothing on your person or in your
baggage that you cannot have the government know about.” Id. at 41. Border officials recently
stopped the Mayor of Stockton, California at San Francisco International Airport and confiscated a
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to official policy: U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) have each passed
directives authorizing agents to conduct these digital border searches.2
The government contends that this intrusive power is justified by a broad
interest in enforcing the law at the border,3 and argues in court that the
practice is consistent with the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition on
unreasonable searches and seizures.4
The U.S. Supreme Court has not yet decided what level of process the
Fourth Amendment requires for digital border searches, although it has
set out general principles governing border searches.5 The Court has
personal cell phone, personal laptop, and city-owned laptop. The mayor was traveling to China on a
business tour with other California mayors. Officials allowed him to leave custody only after he
provided passwords to the devices. Officials returned the devices about a month later, after the
mayor went to federal court. Roger Phillips, Mayor to Get His Electronics Back, THE RECORD (Oct.
21, 2015), http://www.recordnet.com/article/20151021/NEWS/151029932. For additional examles
of the interests at stake in digital border searches, see Ellen Nakashima, Clarity Sought on
Electronics Searches: U.S. Agents Seize Travelers’ Devices, WASH. POST, Feb. 7, 2008, at A1,
available
at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/06/
AR2008020604763_pf.html (recounting story of a technology engineer who was asked by a federal
agent to enter his password into his laptop computer and watched as the officer “copied the Web
sites he had visited”); Sarah Abdurrahman, My Detainment Story, ON THE MEDIA (Sept. 30, 2013),
http://www.onthemedia.org/story/my-detainment-story-or-how-i-learned-stop-feeling-safe-my-owncountry-and-hate-border-patrol/transcript/ (describing her experience as a Muslim-American
journalist during a border search of cell phones); Geoffrey King, For Journalists Coming into US,
Policies Border on the Absurd, COMM. TO PROTECT JOURNALISTS (Oct. 28, 2014),
https://cpj.org/blog/2014/10/for-journalists-coming-into-us-policies-that-borde.php (discussing how
journalists have had to change how they work because of invasive digital border searches).
2. See U.S. CUSTOMS & BORDER PROT., BORDER SEARCH OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES CONTAINING
INFORMATION (2009) [hereinafter CBP DIRECTIVE], available at http://www.cbp.gov/sites/default/
files/documents/elec_mbsa_3.pdf; U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE DIRECTIVE
NO. 7-6.1, BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES (2009) [hereinafter ICE DIRECTIVE],
available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/7-6.1%20directive.pdf. Although the
CBP Directive states that it was subject to review in 2012, it remains listed as current policy. See
CBP Policy Regarding Border Search of Electronic Devices Containing Information, U.S.
CUSTOMS & BORDER PROTECTION, http://www.cbp.gov/document/directives/cbp-policy-regardingborder-search-electronic-devices-containing-information (last visited Sept. 30, 2015).
3. E.g., CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 1, at 1. “Searches of electronic devices help detect
evidence relating to terrorism and other national security matters, human and bulk cash smuggling,
contraband, and child pornography. They can also reveal information about financial and
commercial crimes, such as those relating to copyright, trademark and export control violations.”
Id.; see also id. § 4, at 2 (citing federal statutes relating to immigration, customs, monetary
instruments, and exports).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 959 (9th Cir. 2013) (the government
“sought a broad ruling that no suspicion of any kind was required” for digital border searches);
United States v. Kim, No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *1 (D.D.C. May 8, 2015),
available at https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf (the government
argued that the laptop search was routine and did not require reasonable suspicion).
5. See infra Part I.B–C.
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held that border officials may conduct “routine” searches of persons and
personal property at the border without suspicion of criminal activity or
a warrant.6 The Court has indicated that “nonroutine” searches may
require a heightened standard of process.7 For example, a search that is
particularly destructive to personal property or highly intrusive to
personal dignity may be nonroutine and require some level of suspicion.8
The lower federal courts have faced the difficult task of sorting out
how to apply the Supreme Court’s border search decisions—which
involved searches of physical property and the temporary seizure of
persons—to searches of digital information accessible through
computers and cell phones. There are two main developments in the case
law.9 At first, most federal courts rejected challenges to digital border
searches under the Fourth Amendment and, for the most part, concluded
that border agents did not need any level of suspicion.10
More recent cases suggest the emergence of a second trend. In 2013,
the Ninth Circuit held in United States v. Cotterman11 that the Fourth
Amendment requires border agents to show reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity before conducting a “forensic” digital search of a
computer that could reveal deleted files.12 In doing so, the court
narrowed its 2008 decision in United States v. Arnold,13 in which it had
held that no suspicion was required for any digital border search.14
6. See infra Part I.B–C.
7. See infra Part I.B–C.
8. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155–56 (2004) (“While it may be true that
some searches of property are so destructive as to require [some level of suspicion], this was not one
of them.”); id. at 152 (identifying “dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched” as
“reasons that might support a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive
searches of the person”); cf. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 618 n.13 (1977) (“We do not
decide whether, and under what circumstances, a border search might be deemed ‘unreasonable’
because of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out.”).
9. See infra Part II.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Stewart, 729 F.3d 517, 525–26 (6th Cir. 2013) (concluding that the
nonforensic examination of a laptop computer occurring twenty miles away from the international
airport was a continuation of a routine border search and did not require reasonable suspicion);
United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the Fourth Amendment
does not protect electronic devices, including computers and cell phones, from warrantless and
suspicionless searches in border context); United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 504 (4th Cir. 2005)
(same); United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 F. App’x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007) (stating that there
is no reasonable suspicion required for a routine border search of “[d]ata storage media and
electronic equipment, such as films, computer devices, and videotapes”).
11. 709 F.3d 952 (9th Cir. 2013).
12. Id. at 956–57.
13. 533 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2008).
14. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 960 n.6.
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Nevertheless, the debate in both lines of cases is limited to whether
border officials must meet the lowest level of process required under the
Fourth Amendment—reasonable suspicion—before conducting digital
border searches.15
The United States Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California,16
should spark a change in the doctrine in significant ways. In Riley, the
Court declined to extend the search incident to arrest exception to cell
phones and held that police officers must obtain a warrant before
searching a cell phone incident to arrest.17 The Court recognized that
digital searches are categorically distinct from searches of physical
objects.18 The Court definitively rejected analogies between digital
information accessible by cell phones and physical property19—one of
the principal rationales underlying Arnold and other decisions holding
that no suspicion is required for a digital border search.20 This part of the
Court’s analysis should push lower courts to distinguish digital searches
from searches of physical belongings.
The Court also established that digital searches can be more intrusive
than even the search of one’s home.21 This weighs in favor of requiring
at least reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause, for digital border
searches. Finally, and perhaps most significantly, Riley provides a test
for deciding whether to deviate from the Fourth Amendment’s baseline
warrant requirement in light of new technology.22 The Court’s analysis
on this question supports reconsidering whether to apply the border
search exception to digital searches.
While the scholarly debate largely reflects the pre-Riley debate
analysis in the federal courts over reasonable suspicion,23 this Comment
15. Id. at 968–70; Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008.
16. __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473 (2014).
17. Id. at 2485.
18. See infra notes 278–82 and accompanying text.
19. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
20. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009.
21. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491.
22. See infra Part III.A.
23. See Patrick E. Corbett, The Future of the Fourth Amendment in a Digital Evidence Context:
Where Would the Supreme Court Draw the Electronic Line at the International Border?, 81 MISS.
L.J. 1263 (2012); John Palfrey, The Public and the Private at the United States Border with
Cyberspace, 78 MISS. L.J. 241 (2008); Samuel A. Townsend, Note, Laptop Searches at the Border
and United States v. Cotterman, 94 B.U. L. REV. 1745 (2014); Michael Creta, Comment, A Step in
the Wrong Direction: The Ninth Circuit Requires Reasonable Suspicion for Forensic Examinations
of Electronic Storage Devices During Border Searches in United States v. Cotterman, 55 B.C. L.
REV. E-SUPPLEMENT 31 (2014); Matthew B. Kugler, Comment, The Perceived Intrusiveness of
Searching Electronic Devices at the Border: An Empirical Study, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1165 (2014);
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examines the implications of Riley and its potential to change how courts
assess the reasonableness of digital border searches.24 In short, Riley
supports a higher level of process for digital border searches than what
courts currently require and impliedly settles the debate over reasonable
suspicion for forensic searches. Further, Riley opens up a doctrinal path
for courts to reconsider whether to extend the border search exception to
the warrant requirement—traditionally applied to searches of persons
and personal property—to searches of digital information. After Riley,
courts should require, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion for all digital
border searches and perhaps even a warrant supported by probable
cause.
Indeed, lower courts are already grappling with differing
interpretations of Riley in digital border search cases.25 The Fourth
Circuit may be the first federal court of appeals to take on the issue in
light of these developments following an appeal filed in United States v.
Saboonchi.26 In that case, the defendant and amici argue on appeal that,
Sid Nadkarni, Comment, “Let’s Have a Look, Shall We?” A Model for Evaluating Suspicionless
Border Searches of Portable Electronic Devices, 61 UCLA L. REV. 148 (2013); Benjamin Rankin,
Note, Restoring Privacy at the Border: Extending the Reasonable Suspicion Standard for Laptop
Border Searches, 43 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 301 (2011); Rachel Flipse, Comment, An
Unbalanced Standard: Search and Seizure of Electronic Devices Under the Border Search
Doctrine, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 851 (2010); Scott J. Upright, Note, Suspicionless Border Seizures
of Electronic Files: The Overextension of the Border Search Exception to the Fourth Amendment,
51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 291 (2009); Sunil Bector, Note, Your Laptop, Please: The Search and
Seizure of Electronic Devices at the United States Border, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 695 (2009);
Rasha Alzahabi, Note, Should You Leave Your Laptop at Home When Traveling Abroad?: The
Fourth Amendment and Border Searches of Laptop Computers, 41 IND. L. REV. 161 (2008);
Christine A. Coletta, Note, Laptop Searches at the United States Borders and the Border Search
Exception to the Fourth Amendment, 48 B.C. L. REV. 971 (2007); Kelly A. Gilmore, Note,
Preserving the Border Search Doctrine in a Digital World: Reproducing Electronic Evidence at the
Border, 72 BROOK. L. REV. 759, 761–64 (2007); see also Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth
Amendment Aspects of Computer Searches and Seizures: A Perspective and a Primer, 75 MISS. L.J.
193 (2005) (discussing computer searches under the Fourth Amendment more generally).
24. Gretchen C.F. Shappert noted that the government conceded in Riley that digital searches
incident to arrest “may not be stretched” to include files accessible through a cell phone but stored
remotely. Gretchen C.F. Shappert, The Border Search Doctrine: Warrantless Searches of Electronic
Devices After Riley v. California, 62 U.S. ATT’YS’ BULL., Nov. 2014, at 1, 13. She concluded that
the same principle would apply to digital border searches, though she did not elaborate as to why:
“If a search incident to arrest ‘may not be stretched’ to cover cloud data, then a routine border
search ‘may not be stretched’ either.” Id.
25. See, e.g., United States v. Kim, No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *2 (D.D.C. May
8, 2015), available at https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf
(holding a digital border search was unreasonable under the Riley balancing test analysis); United
States v. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d 815, 816 (D. Md. 2014) (denying motion for reconsideration in
light of Riley and affirming holding that reasonable suspicion is required for a forensic search of
digital devices seized at the border).
26. 990 F. Supp. 2d 536 (2014); Notice of Appeal, United States v. Saboonchi, No. PWG-13-100,
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under Riley, the Fourth Amendment requires border agents to obtain a
warrant to conduct a digital border search or, at a minimum, establish
reasonable suspicion.27
This Comment proceeds in three parts. Part I discusses the border
search exception generally. Part II discusses digital border searches,
focusing on the two major trends in the case law, including a split over
whether a search of digital information should be treated differently
from a search of physical items. Part III discusses Riley, its implications
for other digital searches, and how courts have debated Riley’s impact on
digital border searches thus far. Part III concludes with an analysis of
what courts should take away from Riley when assessing the
constitutionality of digital border searches.
I.

BORDER SEARCHES

Every year, millions of people travel into and out of the United States
with cell phones, tablets, laptops, digital cameras, and other electronic
devices.28 In 2013, 180 million people took international flights serving
the United States.29 A recent survey found that nearly all (ninety-four
percent) of United States adult airline passengers brought at least one
portable electronic device with them onto an aircraft while traveling in
the past twelve months.30 In 2014, 236 million people legally entered the
United States from Canada and Mexico, traveling in personal vehicles
(nearly 189 million), buses (over 5 million), and trains (nearly 295,000),

2015 WL 410506 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 2015).
27. Brief of Appellant at 8–9, United States v. Saboonchi, No. 15-4111 (4th Cir. Feb. 25, 2015);
Brief of Amicus Curiae American Civil Liberties Union and American Civil Liberties Union of
Maryland in Support of Defendant-Appellant at 2–3, Saboonchi, No. 15-4111 (Sept. 3, 2015)
[hereinafter Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU]; Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Frontier Foundation
in Support of Appellant at 4, Saboonchi, No. 15-4111 (Sept. 3, 2015) [hereinafter Brief of Amicus
Curiae EFF].
28. See U.S. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., A REPORT FROM THE PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES
AVIATION RULEMAKING COMMITTEE TO THE FEDERAL AVIATION ADMINISTRATION:
RECOMMENDATIONS ON EXPANDING THE USE OF PORTABLE ELECTRONIC DEVICES DURING FLIGHT
app. H, at H-8 (2013), available at http://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/ped/media/PED_
ARC_FINAL_REPORT.pdf.
29. U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., TOTAL PASSENGERS ON U.S AIRLINES AND FOREIGN AIRLINES
SERVING THE U.S. INCREASED 1.3% IN 2013 FROM 2012 (2014), available at
http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/bts13_14.pdf.
30. U.S. FED. AVIATION ADMIN., supra note 28. The survey found that twenty-eight percent of
travelers used smartphones on flights, twenty-five percent used laptop computers, twenty-three
percent used tablets, twenty-three percent used digital audio or MP3 players, and thirteen percent
used e-readers. Id. app. H, at H-12. Of those traveling with a portable electronic device, ninety-nine
percent took at least one device on the plane as a carry-on item. Id. app. H, at H-11.
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as well as by foot (nearly 42 million).31
Almost all adults in the United States own cell phones. In 2012,
ninety percent of American adults owned a cell phone.32 An estimated
eighty-five percent of Americans aged eighteen to twenty-four owned a
smartphone in 2014.33 Half of American adults owned either a tablet or
an e-reader at the start of 2014.34 Indeed, smartphones have “outpaced
nearly any comparable technology in the leap to mainstream use.”35 As
one court recently put it: “Smartphones, in particular, have become so
deeply embedded in day-to-day activities that travelers cannot
reasonably be expected to travel without them.”36
Americans use personal electronic devices, and smartphones in
particular, in personal ways. Smartphones invite users to share
information in a variety of ways—from sending and receiving texts,
email, and photos to making video calls, managing a calendar, buying
things online, and browsing the internet—and people make full use of
these functions.37 An estimated sixty-two percent of Americans used
their smartphone to get information about a health condition in the past
year and fifty-seven percent have used their smartphone for online
banking.38 Smartphones also gather, retain, and transmit location
information. For example, Apple’s iPhone logs the frequent locations of
31. Border Crossing/Entry Data: Query Detailed Statistics, U.S. DEPARTMENT TRANSP.,
BUREAU TRANSP. STAT., http://transborder.bts.gov/programs/international/transborder/TBDR_BC/
TBDR_BCQ.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2015) (select options for “All Border Ports,” “2014,”
“Annual Summary,” “Aggregate all Ports,” and “All Measures Detail”; then click “Submit” to
retrieve data) (based on data from the Department of Homeland Security, U.S. Customs and Border
Protection, Office of Field Operations).
32. Mobile Technology Fact Sheet, PEW RES. CENTER, http://www.pewinternet.org/factsheets/mobile-technology-fact-sheet/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2015) (webpage updated when new data
is available; included numbers are current as of January 2014 and are based on 2012 data).
33. Mobile Millennials: Over 85% of Generation Y Owns Smartphones, NIELSEN (Sept. 5, 2014),
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/news/2014/mobile-millennials-over-85-percent-ofgeneration-y-owns-smartphones.html.
34. Kathryn Zickuhr & Lee Rainie, E-Reading Rises as Device Ownership Jumps, PEW RES.
CENTER (Jan. 16, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/01/16/e-reading-rises-as-deviceownership-jumps/.
35. Michael DeGusta, Are Smart Phones Spreading Faster than Any Technology in Human
History?, M.I.T. TECH. REV. (May 9, 2012), http://www.technologyreview.com/news/427787/aresmart-phones-spreading-faster-than-any-technology-in-human-history/ (emphasis in original).
36. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 539, 556 (D. Md. 2014).
37. AARON SMITH ET AL., PEW RESEARCH CTR., U.S. SMARTPHONE USE IN 2015, at 33 (2015),
available at http://www.pewinternet.org/files/2015/03/PI_Smartphones_0401151.pdf (noting, for
example, that ninety-seven percent of smartphone users used text messaging, eighty-nine percent
used the internet, eighty-eight percent used email, seventy-five percent used social networking, and
sixty percent took pictures or video).
38. Id. at 5.
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its user and stores that information on the phone, creating an
individualized map of daily routines.39 Many third-party smartphone
applications track location information and increasingly condition
services on collection of that information.40
Border agents likely search the electronic devices of at least several
thousand people annually. They searched electronic devices of 4957
people from October 1, 2012 to August 31, 201341 and 6671 people
during a twenty-month period spanning 2008 to 2010.42 An electronic
device search could include anything from a brief physical inspection to
a search of the device’s contents to copying the device’s contents for the
completion of a future forensic examination.43 The search could also
involve retention of the device to enable a search or seizure of the device
as evidence of a crime or for civil forfeiture.44 Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) considers electronic devices to be no different from
physical containers such as luggage.45
A.

The Fourth Amendment: Warrant, Probable Cause, and
Reasonable Suspicion

The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches or seizures.”46 The Amendment establishes a two-part structure

39. Molly McHugh, A Map in Your iPhone Is Tracking You. Here’s How to Zap It, WIRED (Nov.
13, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/11/how-to-get-rid-of-the-iphone-map-that-tracks-you/.
40. David Pierce, Location Is Your Most Critical Data, and Everyone’s Watching, WIRED (Apr.
27, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/location/ (discussing increased business interest in
individual location information, potential benefits to consumers for allowing businesses to track
everywhere they go, and privacy tradeoffs).
41. Susan Stellin, The Border Is a Back Door for U.S. Device Searches, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 10,
2013, at B1.
42. See
Government
Data
Regarding
Electronic
Device
Searches,
ACLU,
https://www.aclu.org/national-security/government-data-regarding-electronic-device-searches (last
visited Oct. 28, 2015) (summarizing CBP data released pursuant to Freedom of Information Act
suit). A 2010 review conducted by CBP’s Office of Internal Affairs, Management and Inspection
Division, found that CBP did not have a way to provide accurate data on border searches of
electronic devices. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., CIVIL RIGHTS/CIVIL LIBERTIES IMPACT
ASSESSMENT: BORDER SEARCHES OF ELECTRONIC DEVICES DECEMBER 29, 2011, at 2, 7 (2011),
available at http://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Redacted%20Report.pdf (partially
redacted).
43. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 42 at 2.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 7.
46. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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for analyzing searches.47 First, to determine whether the Fourth
Amendment applies, courts assess whether the search invades an
individual interest protected by the Amendment.48 Courts generally use
the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test to determine whether a
particular search implicates an interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment.49 Under this test, an individual must exhibit a subjective
expectation of privacy and society must recognize that expectation as
reasonable.50
Second, the Fourth Amendment requires searches to be
“reasonable,”51 which “generally requires the obtaining of a judicial
warrant” supported by probable cause.52 The policy behind the warrant
requirement is to ensure that “the inferences to support a search are
‘drawn by a neutral and detached magistrate instead of being judged by
the officer engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out
crime.’”53 The Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that “searches

47. See THOMAS K. CLANCY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ITS HISTORY AND INTERPRETATION
§ 1.2, at 3–4 (2d ed. 2014).
48. See id. § 1.2.1.2, at 7–10.
49. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring); Peter P. Swire,
Katz Is Dead. Long Live Katz, 102 MICH. L. REV. 904, 904 (2004) (calling Katz “the king of
Supreme Court surveillance cases”). Some scholars have called for the Court to abandon the
reasonable expectation of privacy test. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism,
51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 1511 (2010) (“The reasonable expectation of privacy test has led to a
contentious jurisprudence that is riddled with inconsistency and incoherence.”). In place of the Katz
two-step, Professor Solove urges courts to provide regulation and oversight “whenever a particular
government information gathering activity creates problems of reasonable significance.” Id. at 1514.
Under Solove’s approach, courts should embrace the broad language of the Fourth Amendment’s
prohibition against “unreasonable” searches and seizures to protect against “not only invasion of
privacy, but also chilling of free speech, free association, freedom of belief, and consumption of
ideas.” Id.
50. See Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 347, 361 (2000) (“Our Fourth Amendment analysis
embraces two questions. First, we ask whether the individual, by his conduct, has exhibited an
actual expectation of privacy . . . . Second, we inquire whether the individual’s expectation of
privacy is one that society is prepared to recognize as reasonable.” (citations omitted) (internal
quotations omitted)).
51. See Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (“[T]he ultimate touchstone
of the Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’”(quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403
(2006))).
52. See id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995)); Kentucky v.
King, 563 U.S. 452, 459 (2011) (“Although the text of the Fourth Amendment does not specify
when a search warrant must be obtained, this Court has inferred that a warrant must generally be
secured.”); cf. CLANCY, supra note 47, § 11.3, at 571 (discussing the five analytical models the
Supreme Court uses to ascertain the reasonableness of a search: “the warrant preference model; the
individualized suspicion model; the totality of the circumstances test; the balancing test; and a
hybrid model giving dispositive weight to the common law”).
53. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948)).
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conducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge
or magistrate, are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—
subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.”54
To obtain a warrant, police must establish probable cause by pointing
to “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant th[e] intrusion.”55 The
Court has described the probable cause standard as requiring a fair
probability that the individual to be searched has committed the crime or
that evidence of the crime will be found.56 Even if the Court finds that a
search falls within an exception to the warrant requirement, it may still
require that the search satisfy either probable cause57 or a lesser standard
called “reasonable suspicion.”58 To establish reasonable suspicion, law
enforcement officers must have a “particularized and objective basis for
suspecting the person stopped of criminal activity” based on “the totality
of the circumstances.”59 In sum, the Fourth Amendment establishes a
54. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009) (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 357); see also King,
563 U.S. at 459. There are a variety of exceptions to the Fourth Amendment probable cause and
warrant requirements, including:
[I]nvestigatory stops, investigatory detentions of property, searches incident to valid arrests,
seizures of items in plain view, searches and seizures justified by exigent circumstances,
consensual searches, searches of vehicles, searches of containers, inventory searches, border
searches, searches at sea, administrative searches, and searches in which the special needs of
law enforcement make the probable cause and warrant requirements impracticable.
Warrantless Searches and Seizures, 41 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 46 (2012). To obtain a
warrant authorizing a search or seizure, the government must demonstrate to a judge or magistrate
two elements. First, that there is “probable cause” to believe that a particular individual or group of
individuals is engaged in criminal activity. See, e.g., Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 178 (2008);
see also CLANCY, supra note 47, § 11.3.2.1.1, at 577–79. Second, the government must show there
is probable cause to believe that the person, place, or thing to be searched has evidence of a crime.
See, e.g., United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705, 717 (1984). The government must have “reasonably
trustworthy information” that is sufficient to “warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief that
an offense has been or is being committed” or that the government will find evidence of a crime in
the place to be searched. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949) (citations omitted)
(internal quotations omitted). Many jurisdictions have made it possible to obtain a warrant quickly,
even within five minutes. See Missouri v. McNeely, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1573 (2013)
(Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
55. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 18 (1968).
56. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009).
57. See Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 34–35 (1963).
58. See United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002); Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119,
123 (2000); United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981); Terry, 392 U.S. at 37; CLANCY,
supra note 47, § 11.3.2.1.2, at 579.
59. Cortez, 449 U.S. at 417–18; see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21 (holding that to justify an intrusion
on reasonable suspicion, an officer must be able “to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant [the] intrusion”).
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baseline standard of a warrant supported by probable cause prior to the
search.60 But, because “the ultimate touchstone of the Fourth
Amendment is ‘reasonableness,’”61 the Court has delineated a range of
lesser standards for limited exceptions, including probable cause without
a warrant, reasonable suspicion, and no suspicion.62 Finally, under the
Fourth Amendment’s particularity requirement, all searches—whether
pursuant to a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement—must
be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the
interference in the first place.”63
B.

The Border Search Exception

Under the border search exception, United States officials may
conduct “routine” searches and seizures of persons and property at the
border without obtaining a warrant or establishing probable cause or
reasonable suspicion.64 The border search exception applies to the
international border and its “functional equivalent,”65 which includes
ports of entry66 and international airports.67 It covers individuals and
60. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
61. Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006).
62. See, e.g., Warden, Md. Penitentiary v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 298–299 (1967) (stating that no
search warrant is required under exigent circumstances if probable cause has been met: “The Fourth
Amendment does not require police officers to delay in the course of an investigation [by obtaining
a warrant] if to do so would gravely endanger their lives or the lives of others”); Terry, 392 U.S. at
27 (holding that an officer may search an individual for weapons based on reasonable suspicion
even if the officer does not have probable cause or a warrant); United States v. Flores-Montano, 541
U.S. 149, 152–53 (2004) (determining that the disassembly of vehicle gas tank at the border did not
require reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant).
63. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985); see also CLANCY, supra note 47, § 11.6.1.1,
at 637–38.
64. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985); see also CLANCY, supra
note 47, § 10.2.2, at 491–97; 5 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE
FOURTH AMENDMENT § 10.5(a) (5th ed. 2012 & Supp. 2014). The border search exception is an
exception to the baseline warrant requirement, not the Fourth Amendment itself. See United States
v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621 (1977) (holding that the border search exception “is a longstanding,
historically recognized exception to the Fourth Amendment’s general principle that a warrant be
obtained”); United States v. Kim, No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *22–23 (D.D.C May
8, 2015), available at https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf (noting
that the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement still applies to border searches).
65. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973) (“Whatever the permissible
scope of intrusiveness of a routine border search might be, searches of this kind may in certain
circumstances take place not only at the border itself, but at its functional equivalents as well.”).
66. See, e.g., United States v. Prince, 491 F.2d 655, 659 (5th Cir. 1974) (noting that the port
where a ship docks after arriving from a foreign country is the “functional equivalent” of the border
(citing Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 272–73)).
67. See, e.g., United States v. Lawson, 461 F.3d 697, 700 (6th Cir. 2006) (finding Detroit
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objects entering or exiting the United States,68 although courts have
offered differing explanations for why the exception applies equally to
entrance and exit searches.69 The historic justification for the border
search exception has been the government’s right to exclude people or
contraband from entering the country.70 This interest allows the
government wide latitude to conduct searches that the Fourth
Amendment would not allow in other contexts.71
The Supreme Court has outlined the contours of the border search
exception in three main cases: United States v. Ramsey,72 United States
v. Montoya de Hernandez,73 and United States v. Flores-Montano.74 In
Ramsey, the Court established that border searches of people and
property generally do not require a warrant or probable cause.75 The
International Airport the “functional equivalent” of the border for flights arriving from foreign
countries); United States v. Klein, 592 F.2d 909, 911 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding that an airport
where an international flight lands qualifies as the “functional equivalent” of the border). Passengers
on domestic flights are not searched pursuant to the border search exception. Rather, the
administrative search exception—reserved for searches unrelated to law enforcement—is used to
justify routine searches of individuals and their effects on domestic flights. See United States v.
Davis, 482 F.2d 893, 908–12 (9th Cir. 1973).
68. See, e.g., United States v. Berisha, 925 F.2d 791, 795 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that routine
stops and searches for currency of travelers exiting the United States fall within the border search
exception).
69. Larry Cunningham, The Border Search Exception as Applied to Exit and Export Searches: A
Global Conceptualization, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 1, 15–29, app. at 40–55 (2007).
70. United States v. 12 200-Ft. Reels of Super 8MM Film (12 200-Ft. Reels of Film), 413 U.S.
123, 125 (1973) (“The Constitution gives Congress broad, comprehensive powers ‘[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations.’ Historically such broad powers have been necessary to prevent
smuggling and to prevent prohibited articles from entry.” (alteration in original) (quoting U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3)).
71. See id. (“Import restrictions and searches of persons or packages at the national borders rest
on different considerations and different rules of constitutional law from domestic regulations.”);
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153–54 (1925) (“Travelers may be so stopped in crossing an
international boundary because of national self protection reasonably requiring one entering the
country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which may be
lawfully brought in.”). The first Congress granted customs officials “full power and authority” to
search ships entering United States ports without a warrant if officials had “reason to suspect any
goods, ware or merchandise subject to duty shall be concealed.” Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 23–
24, 1 Stat. 29, 43. Courts have interpreted the “reason to suspect” language of the statute as
requiring the same standard as “reasonable suspicion.” See, e.g., United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S.
606, 612–13 (1977) (“The ‘reasonable cause to suspect’ test adopted by the [current] statute
[derived from the 1789 Act] is, we think, a practical test which imposes a less stringent requirement
than that of ‘probable cause’ imposed by the Fourth Amendment as a requirement for the issuance
of warrants.” (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8 (1968))).
72. 431 U.S. 606 (1977).
73. 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
74. 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
75. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619. The Court mentioned the border search exception in dicta in earlier
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Court upheld a customs official’s search of several envelopes mailed
from Thailand to the United States.76 The officer had reasonable
suspicion that the envelopes contained merchandise or contraband other
than mere correspondence, and discovered heroin.77 The Court declined
to require a warrant or probable cause for the search in light of the
government’s heightened interests in prohibiting contraband from
entering the country.78 The Court explained that border searches “are
reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at the border,”
reflecting the “long-standing right of the sovereign to protect itself by
stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this
country.”79
Despite this somewhat sweeping language, Ramsey did not establish
that government officials may conduct any kind of border search without
suspicion of criminal activity.80 Rather, the Court found that the customs
agent had reasonable suspicion of a violation of customs law; the Court
did not need to decide whether the Fourth Amendment would allow a
suspicionless search of an envelope.81 The Court concluded it would
make little sense to carve out special protection for envelopes that enter
the United States by mail when, as the petitioner conceded, officials
could warrantlessly search the same envelopes if a traveler physically
carried them into the country.82
Perhaps most important, nothing in Ramsey suggests border agents
may search or read the content of correspondence without a warrant. The
decisions but did not expressly rule on it until Ramsey. See 12 200-Ft. Reels of Film, 413 U.S. at
125; Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 272 (1973); United States v. Thirty-Seven
Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971); Carroll, 267 U.S. at 154 (“Travelers may be so stopped in
crossing an international boundary because of national self-protection reasonably requiring one
entering the country to identify himself as entitled to come in, and his belongings as effects which
may be lawfully brought in.”); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622 (1886).
76. Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 607–08.
77. Id. at 609.
78. Id. at 619.
79. Id. at 620 (“The border-search exception is grounded in the recognized right of the sovereign
to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed by the Constitution, who and what may enter
the country.”); see also Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 376 (noting that the border search “is
an old practice and is intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from the country”).
80. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 625 (Powell, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 614 (majority opinion). The Court found that reasonable suspicion of a customs
violation had been established on the following facts: the envelopes were “bulky” and weighed
“three to six times the normal weight of an airmail letter”; they were from Thailand, “a known
source of narcotics”; they bore addresses of four different locations, apparently typed with the same
typewriter; and, from physical touch, they felt like they contained more than “just plain paper.” Id.
at 609.
82. Id. at 620.
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Court emphasized that “[a]pplicable postal regulations flatly prohibit,
under all circumstances, the reading of correspondence absent a search
warrant,” and rejected the dissent’s concerns about chilled speech on
that basis.83 Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion to underscore his
belief that those limits were sufficient to protect the First and Fourth
Amendment rights at stake in the border context.84
The rule under Ramsey is that officials may conduct routine border
searches without a warrant or probable cause when those searches are
tethered to the government’s interest in examining persons and property
seeking entrance to the United States.85 The Court did not sanction
suspicionless searches of mailed correspondence.86 The Court also
expressly reserved the question of “whether, and under what
circumstances, a border search might be deemed ‘unreasonable’ because
of the particularly offensive manner in which it is carried out.”87
C.

“Routine” and “Nonroutine” Border Searches

The Supreme Court distinguished between “routine” and
“nonroutine” border searches and seizures in United States v. Montoya
de Hernandez.88 The Court explained that, under Ramsey, “[r]outine
searches of the persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any
requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable cause, or warrant,”89 but
that the Court had “not previously decided what level of suspicion would
justify a seizure of an incoming traveler for purposes other than a routine
border search.”90
Customs officials detained Montoya de Hernandez, who was traveling
on a direct flight from Bogota, Colombia, to Los Angeles, California on
suspicion that she was smuggling drugs—specifically, that she had
swallowed balloons of cocaine.91 The facts of the case “clearly
supported” the customs agents’ reasonable suspicion that Montoya de
Hernandez was a cocaine smuggler.92 Montoya de Hernandez claimed
83. Id. at 623.
84. See id. at 625 (Powell, J., concurring).
85. Id. at 616 (majority opinion).
86. Id. at 623.
87. Id. at 618 n.13.
88. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985).
89. Id. at 538.
90. Id. at 540.
91. Id. at 532–36.
92. Id. at 542. She had made eight recent trips to Miami and Los Angeles, but had no family or
friends in the United States and no hotel reservations, despite arriving shortly after midnight. She
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she was pregnant and agreed to take a pregnancy test.93 She declined to
be x-rayed, and the customs inspectors informed her that they would
detain her until she either agreed to an x-ray or produced a monitored
bowel movement that would confirm or deny their suspicions.94 After
sixteen hours of detention, border officials obtained a court order to
conduct a rectal examination, which produced balloons of cocaine.95
The Court held that the customs officials’ reasonable suspicion that
Montoya de Hernandez was smuggling drugs in her alimentary canal
was sufficient to justify her temporary detention.96 The Court explained
that the reasonable suspicion standard “fits well into the situations
involving alimentary canal smuggling at the border,” where the
government has significant interests in preventing drug smuggling but
would “rarely possess probable cause,” at least in part because this kind
of smuggling “gives no external signs.”97 The standard “effects a needed
balance between private and public interests when law enforcement
officials must make a limited intrusion on less than probable cause.”98
As in Ramsey, the Court characterized the government’s interests at
the border in broad terms, noting that customs and immigration officials
are charged with protecting the country from individuals who would
bring in anything harmful, whether in the form of disease or
contraband.99 But the Court’s holding was narrow and limited in
important respects.100 First, the Court reiterated that a border search must
be “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified it
initially.”101 Second, the Court found that reasonable suspicion justified
was carrying $5000 in cash, mostly in $50 bills, but had no billfold; although she claimed she was
planning to purchase merchandise for her husband’s store, she had no appointments with vendors.
She could not recall how she purchased her airline ticket. A female customs inspector conducted a
pat down and strip search in a private area, finding that Montoya de Hernandez was wearing two
pairs of underwear and a paper towel lining her crotch. Id. at 533–34.
93. Id. at 534.
94. Id. at 534–35.
95. Id. at 535–36. Over four days, Montoya de Hernandez eventually passed eighty-eight balloons
containing 528 grams of cocaine. Id. at 536.
96. Id. at 541.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 544.
100. Id. (“We hold that the detention of a traveler at the border, beyond the scope of a routine
customs search and inspection, is justified at its inception if customs agents, considering all the facts
surrounding the traveler and her trip, reasonably suspect that the traveler is smuggling contraband in
her alimentary canal.”).
101. Id. at 542. In assessing whether Montoya de Hernandez’s prolonged incommunicado
detention was “reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified it initially,” the
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Montoya de Hernandez’s initial temporary detention, but not necessarily
a body cavity search.102 Rather, the Court left open the possibility that a
body cavity search would be so intrusive as to require evidence
establishing reasonable suspicion or a higher standard, such as probable
cause or a warrant.103 The Court noted: “[W]e suggest no view on what
level of suspicion, if any, is required for nonroutine border searches such
as strip, body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches.”104
The Supreme Court’s last major statement on border searches came in
United States v. Flores-Montano,105 in which it held that a search
involving the disassembly of an automobile gasoline tank did not require
reasonable suspicion.106 The Court rejected arguments that the defendant
had any privacy interest in his gas tank protected by the Fourth
Amendment,107 or any right to prevent a potentially destructive search of
the tank.108 The Court made it clear that the search of a gas tank was not
the kind of “nonroutine” or highly intrusive search contemplated by
Montoya de Hernandez.109 The Court explained:
[T]he reasons that might support a requirement of some level of
suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person—
dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched—
simply do not carry over to vehicles. Complex balancing tests to
determine what is a “routine” search of a vehicle, as opposed to
a more “intrusive” search of a person, have no place in border
searches of vehicles.110
The Court qualified this statement by leaving open the possibility that a
search could be “so destructive” of one’s property as to warrant similar

Court found it significant that Montoya de Hernandez refused to submit to an x-ray. Id. at 542–43.
“Respondent alone was responsible for much of the duration and discomfort of the seizure.” Id. at
543.
102. Id. at 541 & n.4.
103. Id. at 541.
104. Id. at 541 n.4. The Ninth Circuit has held that reasonable suspicion is required for a strip
search at the border. United States v. Chase, 503 F.2d 571, 574 (9th Cir. 1974).
105. 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
106. Id. at 155–56.
107. Id. at 154 (“It is difficult to imagine how the search of a gas tank, which should be solely a
repository for fuel, could be more of an invasion of privacy than the search of the automobile’s
passenger compartment.”).
108. Id. at 155–56. The Court left open the possibility that a search could be “so destructive” of
one’s property as to warrant a requirement of reasonable suspicion: “While it may be true that some
searches of property are so destructive as to require a different result, this was not one of them.” Id.
109. Id. at 152.
110. Id.
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protection to that of an “intrusive” search of a person.111
The sum of Ramsey, Montoya de Hernandez, and Flores-Montano
leave government officials with relatively wide latitude to conduct
routine border searches and seizures of persons and property without
suspicion of wrongdoing.112 The government has significant interests in
preventing the entrance of unwanted people and contraband, and
individuals crossing the border have a reduced expectation of privacy in
their person and effects.113 Nevertheless, the Court has insisted that the
Fourth Amendment applies to border searches. It has also indicated that
searches that are particularly destructive to property or highly intrusive
to a person likely warrant a heightened standard, and reserved the
question as to whether such searches would require reasonable
suspicion, probable cause, or a warrant.114
One lingering issue is the distinction between “routine” and
“nonroutine” border searches. The Court has yet to define what searches
would be “nonroutine,” or what level of process it would impose for
such searches.115 Nevertheless, lower federal courts have found the
“intrusiveness” of the search—the extent to which the search invades an
individual’s privacy—is what distinguishes a “routine” from a
“nonroutine” border search.116 Courts have considered personal searches
that involve “some level of indignity or intrusiveness,” but fall short of a

111. Id. at 155–56. Before Flores-Montano, federal circuit courts defined destructive property
searches, including drilling into a vehicle or package, as nonroutine border searches requiring
reasonable suspicion. See, e.g., United States v. Rivas, 157 F.3d 364, 367 (5th Cir. 1998) (drilling
into the body of a trailer); United States v. Robles, 45 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1995) (drilling into a metal
cylinder in a wooden crate); United States v. Carreon, 872 F.2d 1436, 1440 (10th Cir. 1989)
(holding reasonable suspicion justified extension of routine vehicle search to include drilling a hole
in a camper wall). After Flores-Montano, courts have been more reluctant to scrutinize such
property searches. E.g., United States v. Cortez-Rocha, 394 F.3d 1115, 1125 (9th Cir. 2005) (noting
that cutting open spare tire in context of border search did not require reasonable suspicion).
112. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985) (“Routine searches of the
persons and effects of entrants are not subject to any requirement of reasonable suspicion, probable
cause, or warrant, and first-class mail may be opened without a warrant on less than probable
cause.” (footnote omitted) (citation omitted)).
113. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154 (“[O]n many occasions, we have noted that the expectation
of privacy is less at the border than it is in the interior.”).
114. Id. at 155–56.
115. See, e.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 963 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The Court has
never defined the precise dimensions of a reasonable border search, instead pointing to the necessity
of a case-by-case analysis.”).
116. See United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 123 (2d Cir. 2006) (“[T]he level of intrusion into
a person’s privacy is what determines whether a border search is routine.”). But see United States v.
Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1346 (11th Cir. 1984) (holding that the “personal indignity suffered by
the individual searched controls the level of suspicion required to make the search reasonable”).
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strip or cavity search, to be routine.117 The First Circuit has listed a
number of factors as relevant to deciding whether a search is routine or
nonroutine.118
On this distinction, lower courts have found searches of an
individual’s outer clothing, personal effects, purse, and wallet119 all to be
routine in the border context. As one federal district court explained,
“pat-downs, pocket-dumps, and even searches that require moving or
adjusting clothing without disrobing, and also may include scanning,
opening, and rifling through the contents of bags or other closed
containers” are all routine kinds of searches.120 Examples of nonroutine
searches requiring reasonable suspicion include strip searches,121
alimentary canal searches,122 x-rays,123 and removal of an artificial
limb.124 In practice, at least in reported cases, the government has
demonstrated significant evidence before conducting such intrusive body
searches: “It is fair to say that most of the reported cases upholding body
cavity border searches have in fact involved rather strong evidence that
smuggled goods were being carried in a body cavity.”125

117. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 549 (D. Md. 2014).
118. United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 512 (1st Cir. 1988). Factors include:
(i) whether the search results in the exposure of intimate body parts or requires the suspect to
disrobe;
(ii) whether physical contact between Customs officials and the suspect occurs during the
search;
(iii) whether force is used to effect the search;
(iv) whether the type of search exposes the suspect to pain or danger;
(v) the overall manner in which the search is conducted; and
(vi) whether the suspect’s reasonable expectations of privacy, if any, are abrogated by the
search.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
119. United States v. Johnson, 991 F.2d 1287, 1291–92 (7th Cir. 1993).
120. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
121. United States v. Adekunle, 980 F.2d 985, 987–88 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Asbury,
586 F.2d 973, 975–76 (2d Cir. 1978); Henderson v. United States, 390 F.2d 805, 809 (9th Cir.
1967); see also United States v. Palmer, 575 F.2d 721, 723 (9th Cir. 1978) (requiring a woman to
“lift her dress so that [her] girdle could be observed”).
122. See Rivas v. United States, 368 F.2d 703, 710 (9th Cir. 1966).
123. United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1349 (11th Cir. 1984). The Supreme Court and
the Fourth Circuit have also assumed that an x-ray search is nonroutine. See United States v.
Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 n.4 (1985); United States v. Aguebor, No. 98-4258,
1999 WL 5110 (4th Cir. Jan. 4, 1999).
124. United States v. Sanders, 663 F.2d 1, 3 (2d Cir. 1981).
125. LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 10.5(e), at 255.
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ICE and CBP have authorized border officers to search, copy, and
retain digital information contained on, or accessible through, electronic
devices at the border without individualized suspicion of criminal
activity.126 Defendants have challenged these searches as unreasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. In particular, defendants have argued that
digital border searches are nonroutine and require reasonable
suspicion.127 This Part discusses major developments in the digital
border search case law.
Part II.A discusses the first wave of major federal appellate cases.
Under the initial prevailing approach, courts generally treated computer
searches as routine and not requiring reasonable suspicion.128 In two
paradigmatic cases—the Fourth Circuit’s decision in United States v.
Ickes129 and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in United States v. Arnold—
courts reached this conclusion by analogizing a search for digital
information on a computer to a search for physical items held in a
physical container, such as luggage or the glove compartment of a car.130
Part II.B discusses a second major doctrinal development, where two
federal courts have concluded that a “forensic” digital border search is
nonroutine and requires reasonable suspicion.131 The Ninth Circuit, in
United States v. Cotterman, and the District of Maryland, in United
126. ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 6.1, at 2; CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 5.1.2, at 3. Both
policies permit indefinite detention of data that pertains to immigration, customs, or other law
enforcement matters. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 42, at 15; ICE DIRECTIVE, supra
note 2, § 8.5(1), at 7; CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 5.4.1.2, at 7. The policies also permit
retention of all devices and data for a reasonable time to conduct a thorough search. This is
generally five days under the CBP policy and thirty days under the ICE policy, but both allow
extensions of time with supervisory approval or extenuating circumstances. ICE DIRECTIVE, supra
note 2, § 8.3(1), at 4–5; CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 5.3.1, at 4.
127. See generally infra Part II.A–B.
128. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008) (holding that the
Fourth Amendment does not protect electronic devices, including computers and cell phones, from
warrantless and suspicionless searches in border context); United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 F.
App’x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007) (no reasonable suspicion required for a routine border search of
“[d]ata storage media and electronic equipment, such as films, computer devices, and videotapes”);
United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 504 (4th Cir. 2005) (no suspicion required for computer search
at the border); Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 277–78 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (dismissing the
lawsuit for lack of standing, but nevertheless concluding that reasonable suspicion was not required
for a laptop search); United States v. Bunty, 617 F. Supp. 2d 359, 365 (E.D. Pa. 2008) (no
reasonable suspicion required to search through computer disks).
129. 393 F.3d 501 (4th Cir. 2005).
130. See infra notes 166–75 and accompanying text.
131. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013); United States v. Saboonchi,
990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 539 (D. Md. 2014).
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States v. Saboonchi, moved away from the “container” analogy and
recognized distinct Fourth Amendment interests implicated by extensive
searches of digital information.132 Nevertheless, both courts agreed that
border agents may conduct manual digital border searches of electronic
devices without reasonable suspicion, thereby affirming a core holding
common to Ickes and Arnold.133
Courts have generally focused on whether reasonable suspicion is
required for the search. In almost all cases federal courts have found that
government agents had established reasonable suspicion.134 Some courts
have reached the question of whether reasonable suspicion is required,
even while finding that it has been met.135 Others have declined to reach
the question either because they found that the search was routine136 or
to avoid reaching a constitutional question that was not necessary for the
disposition of the case.137 As a practical matter, the federal government
has consistently argued that it does not need reasonable suspicion to
conduct a digital border search, no matter how intrusive.138
132. See infra Part II.B.
133. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966–67; Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 546.
134. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 970 (border agents had reasonable suspicion); United States v.
Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 503–05 (4th Cir. 2005) (suggesting that reasonable suspicion had been met but
nevertheless holding that no suspicion was required); United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d 1007, 1014
(5th Cir. 2001) (customs agents had reasonable suspicion); United States v Hassanshahi, 75 F. Supp.
3d 101, 119 (D.D.C. 2014) (same); Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 571 (same); Abidor v.
Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (finding reasonable suspicion). But see
United States v. Stewart, 729 F.3d 517, 524 (6th Cir. 2013) (initial computer search was routine, not
requiring reasonable suspicion).
135. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968 (reasonable suspicion satisfied); Abidor, 990 F. Supp. 2d at
282 (same).
136. See United States v. Linarez-Delgado, 259 F. App’x 506, 508 (3d Cir. 2007). Courts have
also considered arguments that conducting a computer search away from the border is an “extended
border search”—a search that occurs after an individual has been cleared for entry and regained a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Extended border searches require reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity. But, where a computer has not been cleared for entry, as in most cases, courts
have rejected arguments that a subsequent offsite search is an extended border search. E.g., Stewart,
729 F.3d at 524–26 (sending laptop off site to conduct a search, but not a forensic examination, was
a continuation of a routine border search and not an extended border search requiring reasonable
suspicion).
137. See United States v. Irving, 452 F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2006) (finding reasonable suspicion
met and declining to determine whether search of computer diskettes and undeveloped film required
reasonable suspicion); Hassanshahi, 75 F. Supp. 3d at 119.
138. See, e.g., Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 959 (“[H]aving failed to obtain a favorable ruling on that
ground, the government did not challenge on appeal the conclusion that there was no reasonable
suspicion. Rather, it sought a broad ruling that no suspicion of any kind was required.”); United
States v. Kim, No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *1 (D.D.C. May 8, 2015), available at
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf; see also Saboonchi, 990 F.
Supp. 2d at 540 (government arguing forensic digital border search was routine).
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At the outset, it is useful to note that border searches of electronic
devices can take at least three forms. This Comment draws descriptive
categories based on examples from DHS policies and case law: (1) a
physical device search (which is not the primary subject of this
Comment) and two kinds of digital searches, (2) a manual digital search
and (3) a forensic digital search. Border officials may digitally search a
wide range of devices: “any devices that may contain information, such
as computers, disks, drives, tapes, mobile phones and other
communication devices, cameras, music and other media players, and
any other electronic or digital devices.”139
In a physical device search, a border officer examines physical
aspects of the device, not the information stored on it.140 For example,
the agent might ask an individual to turn on a cell phone, camera, or
computer to confirm that the device is what it appears to be.141 This may
also involve physically opening the device to determine whether it
contains anything out of the ordinary.142 In any case, the agent does not
examine data stored on or accessed via the device, and the overall
purpose of the search is to find physical evidence that may be contained
inside the device or confirm that the device is what it appears to be.
In a manual digital search, an officer searches digital information
contained on or accessible through the device.143 This could be a
relatively superficial search—scrolling through contacts or recent calls
on a smartphone, or opening up a desktop folder to browse the names of
files.144 But it could also include a relatively extensive examination of
digital information, depending in large part on how much time the
officer has to search.145
139. CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 3.2, at 2.
140. See id. § 3.4, at 2 (distinguishing between searches for digital information and turning a
device on or determining whether a device contains physical contraband).
141. See, e.g., United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008) (CBP officer
“instructed Arnold to turn on the computer so she could see if it was functioning”).
142. See, e.g., United States v. Molina–Gómez, 781 F.3d 13, 17 (1st Cir. 2015) (discussing a
search where a border official disassembled laptop computer and Playstation and discovered black
bags containing heroin hidden inside); Abidor, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 268 (Abidor alleged that his
laptop and external hard drive had been physically opened in addition to being searched).
143. See, e.g., Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1005 (“When the computer had booted up, its desktop
displayed numerous icons and folders. Two folders were entitled ‘Kodak Pictures’ and one was
entitled ‘Kodak Memories.’ [CBP officers] Peng and Roberts clicked on the Kodak folders, opened
the files, and viewed the photos on Arnold’s computer including one that depicted two nude
women.”).
144. See id.
145. For example, in Arnold, after the initial search turned up suspicious images, border officers
detained Arnold for several hours and thoroughly searched his computer. Id. In United States v.
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Finally, a forensic digital search is similar to a digital border search in
that the goal is to identify information stored on the device, but it has
several distinct technical aspects that make it potentially more
exhaustive.146 In most cases, an officer first confiscates the electronic
device. A computer expert then makes an exact copy of the device’s
hard drive and uses sophisticated software to exhaustively search all data
on the device, including ostensibly deleted files.147 The search can take
days, weeks, or months, depending on the amount of data.148
It is relatively easy to distinguish between a physical device search
and either kind of digital search. The physical search examines only
physical aspects of the device, whereas a digital search is a search of,
and for, information. It is more difficult to differentiate a manual digital
search from a forensic digital search, because both involve informational
searches, but courts have generally looked to the method of the search to
draw the distinction. For example, in United States v. Saboonchi, the
court identified three aspects of the process that make a search
“forensic.”149 These aspects include creating an exact copy of the

Kim, No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *19–20 (D.D.C. May 8, 2015), available at
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf, the government argued that
the search at issue was not “forensic” because a person with unlimited time could locate the same
documents. See also United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (D. Md. 2014)
(acknowledging that digital border searches that are not “forensic” may nevertheless be “deeply
probing and . . . invasive”).
146. See Orin S. Kerr, Searches and Seizures in a Digital World, 119 HARV. L. REV. 531, 537–47
(2005) (discussing technical details and practices involved in computer forensics).
147. E.g., United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2013). In Cotterman:
The agents . . . retained the Cottermans’ laptops and a digital camera. Agent Brisbine drove
almost 170 miles . . . to the ICE office in Tucson, Arizona, where he delivered both laptops and
one of the three digital cameras to ICE Senior Special Agent & Computer Forensic Examiner
John Owen. Agent Owen began his examination on Saturday, the following day. He used a
forensic program to copy the hard drives of the electronic devices. . . . Agent Owen then used
forensic software that often must run for several hours to examine copies of the laptop hard
drives. He began his personal examination of the laptops on Sunday. That evening, Agent
Owen found seventy-five images of child pornography within the unallocated space of
Cotterman’s laptop.
Id. (footnotes omitted). “[U]nallocated space” contains deleted data that has yet to be overwritten
with new data and can only be accessed with forensic software. Id.
148. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 561 (“In a forensic search of electronic storage, a bitstream
copy is created and then is searched by an expert using highly specialized analytical software—
often over the course of several days, weeks, or months—to locate specific files or file types,
recover hidden, deleted, or encrypted data, and analyze the structure of files and of a drive.”); Kim,
2015 BL 134375, at *15 (DHS special agent stated in affidavit that the “identification and extraction
process . . . may take weeks or months” (alteration in original)); Kerr, supra note 146, at 544
(“[T]he analyst may spend several weeks or even months analyzing a single hard drive.”).
149. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d, at 564.
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device’s hard drive;150 using software that provides access to all
information on a device, including previously deleted files;151 and using
software that provides access to location information and other
“metadata.”152 But even if courts can distinguish between manual and
forensic digital searches based on technical attributes, the amount and
kind of information that each search can reveal may be more dependent
on nontechnical aspects of the search—especially time—than technical
aspects.153
A.

Digital Border Search 1.0: Digital Border Searches Are Routine
and Do Not Require Reasonable Suspicion

Two federal appellate decisions illustrate the first major doctrinal
development with respect to digital border searches: the Fourth Circuit’s
decision in United States v. Ickes and the Ninth Circuit’s decision in
United States v. Arnold.
In Ickes, the Fourth Circuit held that a manual digital border search of
Ickes’s computer was routine and that border agents did not have to
establish any level of suspicion before executing it.154 The court treated
computer files as indistinguishable from any other “cargo” subject to
routine search and inspection at the border.155 The court rejected Ickes’s
argument that the First Amendment granted special protection to digital
information because it is expressive.156 Such logic “would create a
sanctuary at the border for all expressive material—even for terrorist
plans.”157 The court also expressed skepticism that its decision would
result in widespread suspicionless digital searches because “[c]ustoms
agents have neither the time nor the resources to search the contents of
every computer.”158
Although it declined to do so, the Ickes court likely could have found
that border officials satisfied reasonable suspicion for the search of his
computer.159 The court acknowledged that Ickes raised suspicion through
150. Id. at 564–66.
151. Id. at 566–68.
152. Id. at 568–69.
153. See Kim, 2015 BL 134375, at *19–20.
154. United States v. Ickes, 393 F.3d 501, 505–06 (2005).
155. Id. at 504.
156. Id. at 506.
157. Id.
158. Id. at 506–07.
159. See United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 546 (D. Md. 2014) (noting that the
officers in Ickes “likely had reasonable suspicion before they viewed the contents of the disks”).
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his conduct and possessions, which “suggest[ed] the need to search
further,” but nevertheless explained that no suspicion was required for
the search.160 Deference to the discretion of border officials, the court
said, is the “essence” of the border search exception, which requires
“reliance upon the trained observations and judgments of customs
officials, rather than upon constitutional requirements” applied in
different contexts.161
In Arnold, the Ninth Circuit also held that digital border searches do
not require reasonable suspicion.162 Arnold was stopped at customs at
Los Angeles International Airport after a trip to the Philippines.163
Border officials asked Arnold to turn on his computer and briefly
examined two desktop folders labeled “Kodak Pictures” and “Kodak
Memories,” one of which revealed a photo of nude women.164 The
border agent called in supervisors who searched his laptop further over
several hours, finding numerous images they believed depicted child
pornography.165
As in Ickes, the court premised its holding on the concept that a
search of a computer is no different than a search of any other item of
personal property.166 The court found that Arnold “failed to distinguish
how the search of his laptop and its electronic contents is logically any
different from the suspicionless border searches of travelers’ luggage
that the Supreme Court and we have allowed.”167 The court also
Ickes was traveling into the United States from Canada. He told the first border agent that he was on
vacation, but his van appeared to hold everything he owned, so a second agent began a cursory
inspection. The second agent found a video camera, which contained coverage of a tennis match
that focused “excessively on a young ball boy.” Ickes, 393 F.3d at 502. The agents searched the van
and found marijuana seeds and pipes and a copy of a warrant for Ickes’s arrest, as well as a
computer and several albums containing what appeared to be child pornography. Id. at 503.
160. Ickes, 393 F.3d at 507.
161. Id. In other cases where law enforcement possessed reasonable suspicion of criminal activity
prior to a digital border search, courts have generally declined to decide whether the Fourth
Amendment permits a suspicionless digital border search. See, e.g., United States v. Irving, 452
F.3d 110, 124 (2d Cir. 2006) (“A border search is valid under the Fourth Amendment, even if nonroutine, if it is supported by reasonable suspicion.”); see also United States v. Roberts, 274 F.3d
1007, 1014 (5th Cir. 2001) (assuming, but not deciding, that a search of a laptop and computer disks
is nonroutine, and expressly avoiding the question in order to decide a constitutional question on the
narrowest grounds possible).
162. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1008 (9th Cir. 2008).
163. Id. at 1005.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 1008.
167. Id. at 1009. The court reasoned that, for border searches, “the Supreme Court has refused to
draw distinctions between containers of information and contraband with respect to their quality or
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interpreted Flores-Montano to create a categorical rule for border
searches of physical property, including laptops.168 Under this reading,
border searches of any item of personal property do not implicate
privacy or dignity interests.169
Concluding that computers are no different from other personal
property allowed the court to draw two other conclusions. First, the court
compared Arnold’s laptop to the gas tank of the car in FloresMontano,170 where the Supreme Court held that dismantling a gas tank
did not require reasonable suspicion but suggested that a particularly
destructive search of personal property might.171 Similarly, the Ninth
Circuit reasoned that the search of Arnold’s computer would have to
have caused significant physical damage to the computer to trigger the
reasonable suspicion requirement, but Arnold had made no such
claim.172
Second, the court analogized the search of the digital information on
Arnold’s computer to a search of physical items in a closed container
such as luggage or a purse or wallet.173 The court cited California v.
Acevedo,174 where the Supreme Court held that the Fourth Amendment
permits police to “look[] inside a closed container” when already
properly searching a car.175 The Ninth Circuit concluded that searching a
laptop was akin to searching a container and could not be “particularly
offensive” to Arnold simply because it could reveal far more information
than a search of virtually any other physical container.176

nature for purposes of determining the appropriate level of Fourth Amendment protection.” Id. DHS
has analogized computers and cell phones to physical containers. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., supra note 42, at 6 (“[Electronic] devices are one of many types of items or
containers that may be searched, usually during secondary inspection.”).
168. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1008 (“The Supreme Court’s analysis [in Flores-Montano] determining
what protection to give a vehicle was not based on the unique characteristics of vehicles with
respect to other property, but was based on the fact that a vehicle, as a piece of property, simply
does not implicate the same ‘dignity and privacy’ concerns as ‘highly intrusive searches of the
person.’” (quoting United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 152 (2004))).
169. Id.
170. Id. at 1008–09.
171. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155–56.
172. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009.
173. Id. at 1009–10.
174. 500 U.S. 565 (1991).
175. Id. at 576.
176. Arnold, 533 F.3d at 1009–10. The court also rejected Arnold’s argument that a search of a
laptop was analogous to a search of a home because of a laptop’s storage capacity. Id.
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Digital Border Search 2.0: Forensic Digital Border Searches of
Electronic Devices Are Nonroutine and Require Reasonable
Suspicion

The principles behind Arnold and Ickes have come under challenge,
particularly in cases involving forensic digital searches at the border.
Two recent cases—United States v. Cotterman and United States v.
Saboonchi—show the emergence of a new and competing doctrine on
digital border searches that embraces parts of Arnold and Ickes while
repudiating others.
1.

United States v. Cotterman

In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit held that a forensic digital border
search is nonroutine and requires reasonable suspicion.177 Sitting en
banc, the court concluded that “the comprehensive and intrusive nature
of a forensic examination . . . trigger[s] the requirement of reasonable
suspicion.”178 The majority explained that the “painstaking analysis”
involved in the forensic examination, which included copying and
searching Cotterman’s hard drive in its entirety, including ostensibly
deleted files, “is akin to reading a diary line by line looking for mention
of criminal activity—plus looking at everything the writer may have
erased.”179
The court emphasized how the technological capabilities of modern

177. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 968 (9th Cir. 2013).
178. Id. at 962. The district court found that the border agents failed to establish reasonable
suspicion and granted Cotterman’s motion to suppress. Id. at 959. The Ninth Circuit found that
border officials had reasonable suspicion and reversed. Id. at 957. The Ninth Circuit’s reversal of
that finding was based on five factors. First, Cotterman and his wife were returning from Mexico, “a
country associated with sex tourism.” Id. at 968–69. Second, at primary inspection the Treasury
Enforcement Communication System (TECS), a database used by DHS to track individuals
suspected of criminal activity, indicated that Cotterman was convicted of child molestation in 1992
and may be involved in child sex tourism. Id. at 957. Third, Cotterman and his wife were carrying a
variety of electronic equipment: two computers and three digital cameras. Id. Fourth, Cotterman
traveled frequently. Id. at 969. Fifth, Cotterman protected certain files with password protection,
which could be used to further the possession of child pornography. Id. Judge Milan Smith, writing
in dissent, criticized the majority for finding reasonable suspicion on these “weak facts,” which he
found fell “woefully short.” Id. at 982, 990–94 (Smith, J., dissenting). At least one other court has
questioned whether being on the TECS list itself supports a finding of reasonable suspicion for a
search. See United States v. Laich, No. 08-20089, 2010 WL 259041, at *4 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 20,
2010) (finding the fact that Laich was on the TECS list “unpersuasive, in that the Government has
not provided the Court with any insight into the overall nature of the TECS list, the standards, if
any, that were used to determine an individual’s placement on this list, or the significance, if any, of
being designated as one for whom officials should ‘lookout’”).
179. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 962–63.
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cell phones and laptops make a forensic digital search especially
intrusive—and analytically distinct from searches of other forms of
property.180 A forensic search provides law enforcement with access to a
traveler’s information in ways that are quantitatively and qualitatively
different from routine border searches of physical belongings.181 Modern
electronic devices are capable of storing “warehouses full of
information”—far more information about an individual than a person
could physically travel with.182 Moreover, electronic devices are not
simply repositories for files that individuals routinely carry. Rather, they
are “simultaneously offices and personal diaries” that “contain the most
intimate details of our lives: financial records, confidential business
documents, medical records and private emails.”183
In a rejection of the logic of its earlier decision in Arnold, the Ninth
Circuit concluded that the characteristics of a forensic digital search
implicate important privacy and dignity interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment because of the “uniquely sensitive nature of data on
electronic devices.”184 The possibility of intruding upon these privacy
and dignity interests is what distinguishes a forensic digital search from
other kinds of property searches at the border such as disassembling a
gas tank, as in Flores-Montano,185 or drilling a hole in the bed of a
pickup truck186—searches that have “little implication for an individual’s
dignity and privacy interests.”187 The court repudiated Arnold’s
categorical approach to property searches, finding instead that what is
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment “must account for differences
in property.”188 That analysis must recognize that individuals and society
have different expectations of privacy with respect to different kinds of
property. While travelers expect searches of physical property at the
border, they do not expect border agents to “mine every last piece of
180. Id. at 965 (“The point is technology matters.”).
181. Id.
182. Id. at 964.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 966 (finding that a forensic digital search is “essentially a computer strip search. An
exhaustive forensic search of a copied laptop hard drive intrudes upon privacy and dignity interests
to a far greater degree than a cursory search at the border”); cf. supra notes 166–76 and
accompanying text (describing the reasoning in Arnold).
185. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 150–51 (2004).
186. See United States v. Chaudhry, 424 F.3d 1051, 1054 (9th Cir. 2005).
187. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 966 (“[T]he uniquely sensitive nature of data on electronic devices
carries with it a significant expectation of privacy and thus renders an exhaustive exploratory search
more intrusive than with other forms of property.”).
188. Id.
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data on their devices or deprive them of their most personal property for
days” absent some particularized suspicion.189
The court recognized the government’s substantial interest in
protecting the country from contraband, an interest that “may be
heightened” by national crises such as drug smuggling or international
terrorism.190 But the court emphasized that “reasonableness remains the
touchstone” of the Fourth Amendment, even at the border, and cautioned
that the Supreme Court “has never endorsed the proposition that the goal
of deterring illegal contraband at the border suffices to justify any
manner of intrusive search.”191
The majority defended the reasonable suspicion requirement as a
“modest, workable standard” that law enforcement officials already
apply in other contexts.192 Responding to the dissent,193 the majority
reasoned that the practical considerations of border control—in
particular, the “sheer number of international travelers”—are such that,
“as a matter of commonsense and resources, it is only when reasonable
suspicion is aroused that such searches typically take place.”194 The
court concluded that the substantial privacy and dignity interests people
have in digital information outweigh the government’s interests in
conducting a forensic digital border search without any suspicion.195
The Cotterman majority distinguished a forensic search from other
digital border searches that it considered routine but failed to elaborate
on the distinction.196 For example, whereas the First Circuit created a list
of factors for determining whether a particular search at the border was
routine or nonroutine, the Ninth Circuit created no such framework for
defining a forensic digital search in contrast to a manual one.197 Instead,
the Ninth Circuit largely left the details to law enforcement to “make a

189. Id. at 967–68 (internal citation omitted).
190. Id. at 966 (internal quotations omitted).
191. Id. at 967.
192. Id. at 966.
193. See id. at 985 (Smith, J., dissenting).
194. Id. at 967 n.14 (majority opinion).
195. Id. at 967–68.
196. Lower courts have had difficulty applying the distinction. See United States v. Kim, No. 13cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *19–21 (D.D.C. May 8, 2015), available at
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf; United States v. Saboonchi,
990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 552–58 (D. Md. 2014) (“[I]it is difficult to figure out the precise basis on
which the Ninth Circuit distinguished forensic searches from conventional ones.”).
197. Compare Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967, with United States v. Braks, 842 F.2d 509, 511–12
(1st Cir. 1988) (listing factors for determining whether a particular body search at the border is
routine or nonroutine).
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commonsense differentiation between a manual review of files on an
electronic device and application of computer software to analyze a hard
drive.”198
The court did state that the search in Arnold was permissible without
reasonable suspicion, even while narrowing Arnold to its facts.199 The
court characterized the search in Arnold as a “quick look and unintrusive
search.”200 Although the search in Arnold began as a brief look into two
desktop folders, it ultimately lasted several hours.201 As the Saboonchi
court noted, the complete search in Arnold “hardly is ‘quick’ in the
conventional sense and, to the contrary, actually shows how lengthy and
comprehensive a conventional search can be.”202 The Cotterman
majority’s abbreviated discussion of the differences between forensic
and manual digital searches and its approval of the digital search in
Arnold illustrate the challenges of drawing a clear line between digital
searches that are so intrusive as to require reasonable suspicion—or
some higher standard—and those that do not.
2.

United States v. Saboonchi

In United States v. Saboonchi, border agents confiscated and
forensically searched two smartphones and a flash drive after stopping
Ali Saboonchi and his wife, who were returning to New York after a day
trip to Canada.203 The government argued that the searches were routine
198. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967.
199. Id. at 960, 960 n.6.
200. Id. at 960.
201. United States v. Arnold, 533 F.3d 1003, 1005 (9th Cir. 2008). The district court found that
the border agents had not established reasonable suspicion before conducting the search. Id.
202. United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 555 (D. Md. 2014). Saboonchi read
Cotterman’s interpretation of Arnold broadly, to include the full search that took place. But there is
a narrower reading as well. In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit may have meant to include only the
initial search of Arnold, which turned up the first photo, within its definition of a “quick . . . and
unintrusive” digital search, given the fact that the initial search aroused enough suspicion that the
border agents decided to dig further. For example, later in the opinion the majority emphasized that
“suspicionless searches of the type approved in Arnold will continue; border officials will conduct
further, forensic examinations where their suspicions are aroused by what they find or by other
factors.” Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967. The court also contrasted a forensic search with a “cursory”
search of a computer at the border. Id. at 966. In any case, the Ninth Circuit was not particularly
clear on whether there are any limits for a nonforensic digital search at the border.
203. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 539. The agents stopped Saboonchi and his wife for
secondary questioning after Saboonchi turned up a hit on the Treasury Enforcement Communication
System (TECS). Id. at 541. DHS had flagged Saboonchi, who is a dual citizen of the United States
and Iran, in connection with suspicion that he may be violating restrictions on export to Iran. Id. at
539. The agents questioned Saboonchi and his wife separately and seized two smartphones and a
flash drive. Id. The couple was then allowed to reenter the United States. Id. A DHS special agent
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and therefore subject to no reasonable suspicion requirement under
Ickes.204 The court agreed that, under Ickes, “the mere fact that a search
includes computer files does not transform it from routine to
nonroutine.”205 Nevertheless, the court distinguished Ickes on the
grounds that it did not address forensic digital searches.206 It concluded
that such searches are “sui generis” and require reasonable suspicion.207
The court reached the same result as the Ninth Circuit in Cotterman
but went much further in its analysis as to why forensic searches are
uniquely intrusive. The court identified three factors that differentiate
forensic digital searches from other digital searches.208 First, because a
forensic search requires making an exact copy of the electronic device’s
hard drive, it does not present the same time constraints and allows
border agents to complete the search long after the individual has left the
border.209 A forensic search allows for an exhaustive search of all
information on the device in a way that a manual search of a computer in
the border context would be unable to replicate.210 Even a lengthy
seizure may raise questions if it is not “reasonably related in scope to the
circumstances which justified it initially.”211
Second, the use of specialized software in a forensic search provides
access to previously deleted information and unsaved data.212 This limits
the traveler’s ability to choose what to travel with.213 In a world of
suspicionless forensic digital searches, a traveler who wishes to maintain
private or confidential records “would be well advised never to put
private or personal data on her computer or smartphone.”214 It is this
subsequently conducted a forensic search of the smartphones and flash drive. Id. at 539–40.
204. Id. at 544, 546.
205. Id. at 546; see also id. at 554 (“At the very least, Ickes forecloses the possibility that the
mere fact that an electronic device may contain massive amounts of personal data, by itself, can
change the legal analysis at the border . . . .”).
206. Id. at 546.
207. Id. at 568.
208. Id. at 564.
209. Id. at 564–66.
210. Id.; see also id. at 547 (“No matter how thorough or highly motivated the agent is, a manual
search of a computer or digital device will never result in the human visualization of more than a
fraction of the content of the device.”).
211. Id. at 565 (quoting United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 543 (1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
212. Id. at 566–67.
213. Id. at 567; cf. Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) (arguing that
travelers should “[t]hink twice about the information [they] carry on [their] laptop” (first alteration
in original)).
214. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 567 (emphasis in original).
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aspect of forensic digital searches that “stretches the computer-to-closedcontainer analogy beyond its breaking point.”215 Third, a forensic search
provides access to location information and other metadata that can
reveal intimate information about a person, including even domestic
activities traditionally protected by the Fourth Amendment.216 These
factors led the court to conclude that “[i]t is difficult to conceive of a
property search more invasive or intrusive than a forensic computer
search—it essentially is a body cavity search of a computer.”217
Despite strong language about the privacy and dignity interests in
digital information, and acknowledgement that manual digital border
searches could be “deeply probing” and “invasive,”218 the court
maintained that manual digital border searches do not require any level
of suspicion.219 The court reasoned that a manual digital border search is
limited by the practicalities of the border context—especially the amount
of time border agents can spend searching computers and cell phones.220
The court was constrained by Ickes, which may have compelled that
conclusion.221 The problem is that, while the court rejected the container
analogy for forensic digital searches, it oddly reaffirmed it for other
digital searches.222 In the court’s view, a digital border search can be
analogized to the search of a suitcase, even if a forensic search cannot:
[A manual digital] search has the same inherent limitations—
and the same inherent risk of invasiveness—irrespective of what
is being searched. There is only a finite amount of time available
for a CBP agent to detain a traveler at the border to search the
contents of his suitcase or laptop.223
Although Saboonchi and Cotterman have important differences,224
215. Id.
216. Id. at 568–69 (“[A] Customs officer performing a forensic search can recreate the most
intimate details of a person’s life over the course of the last several months—even if the data
includes highly personal details of what transpired before leaving the country or while in one’s own
home.”).
217. Id. at 569.
218. Id. at 547.
219. Id. at 569. The court used the term “conventional” computer search to describe any digital
search that is nonforensic, i.e., manual digital searches. See supra notes 141–53 and accompanying
text.
220. Id. at 564.
221. Id. at 569.
222. Id. at 564.
223. Id.
224. In particular, Saboonchi provides a more robust distinction between forensic digital searches
and other digital searches. Cf. supra notes 196–202, 208–17 and accompanying text.
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their broad strokes are similar. Both decisions establish that forensic
digital searches are nonroutine and must be supported by reasonable
suspicion.225 Both also reject analogies between forensic digital searches
and searches of physical property, such as items in closed containers.226
And yet, perhaps both courts did not embrace their own analyses
enough. Both allow manual digital searches without suspicion.227 In this
regard, both decisions allow digital fishing expeditions at the border, so
long as they are carried out manually—which cuts against the Fourth
Amendment requirement that searches be limited in scope.228 On all of
these points, prior case law played a role. Arnold and Ickes shaped
Cotterman and Saboonchi in significant ways, perhaps preventing the
courts in both cases from considering the full range of standards
available under the Fourth Amendment.
III. DIGITAL BORDER SEARCHES 3.0: HOW SHOULD COURTS
REGULATE DIGITAL BORDER SEARCHES AFTER RILEY v.
CALIFORNIA?
The Supreme Court has not yet decided what level of process the
Fourth Amendment requires for a digital border search.229 But its
decision in Riley v. California provides relevant guidance. Whereas the
courts in Cotterman and Saboonchi were constrained by precedent,230
225. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 957 (9th Cir. 2013); Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d
at 539.
226. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 964; Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 567.
227. Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 959; Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d at 547. In Abidor v. Napolitano, the
court declined to hold that reasonable suspicion is required for a forensic digital search because it
would have no practical effect on current practice and may have a “chilling effect” on border
officials. 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2013). Nevertheless, the court “agree[d] with the
Ninth Circuit that, if suspicionless forensic computer searches at the border threaten to become the
norm, then some threshold showing of reasonable suspicion should be required.” Id.
228. See New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985) (requiring courts to “determine whether
the search as actually conducted ‘was reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which
justified the interference in the first place’” (citation omitted)).
229. United States v. Kim, No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *10 (D.D.C. May 8,
2015), available at https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf.
230. The Ninth Circuit’s distinction between forensic digital border searches and other digital
border searches was central to its rationale in Cotterman and allowed it to affirm Arnold while
narrowing that decision to its facts. See Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 967 (distinguishing between
forensic and other digital searches); id. at 960 n.6 (narrowing Arnold). In Saboonchi, the court
emphasized its opinion was consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s decision in Ickes. See Saboonchi,
990 F. Supp. 2d at 552 (“Ickes makes it clear that a routine border search may include a
conventional inspection of electronic media and a review of the files on them just as it may include
physical papers.”); id. at 560 (“[T]he Fourth Circuit has stated [in Ickes] that a conventional search
of a computer is not legally distinct from a conventional search of a closed container.”).
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resulting in a limited debate over whether forensic digital searches
require reasonable suspicion, Riley opens up a doctrinal path to
reexamine digital border searches. In doing so, courts should consider
the full range of standards provided by Fourth Amendment doctrine: a
warrant based on probable cause, probable cause without a warrant,
reasonable suspicion, or no suspicion at all. Indeed, courts and litigants
have already begun debating Riley’s impact on this issue. Two federal
district courts have interpreted Riley’s applicability to digital border
searches in different ways.231 The defendant in one of those cases has
argued on appeal to the Fourth Circuit that Riley changes the digital
border search analysis.232 This Part discusses Riley, its implications for
digital border searches, how two lower courts have analyzed digital
border searches after the decision, and considerations for courts moving
forward.
A.

Riley and the New Digital Search Calculus

The Supreme Court held in Riley that police must obtain a warrant
before searching the digital information on a cell phone incident to an
individual’s arrest.233 The Court recognized that a search of digital
information in a cell phone is categorically different from a search of
one’s person or physical effects.234 To determine whether to exempt
searches of cell phones incident to arrest from the warrant requirement,
the Court applied a balancing test weighing the state’s interests in
security and retaining evidence against the individual’s privacy
interests.235 The Court concluded that digital information carries
substantial privacy interests and is qualitatively and quantitatively
different from any physical items individuals typically carry.236 The
231. See United States v. Saboonchi, No. 13-cr-00100, 2014 BL 207375, at *1 (D. Md. July 28,
2014), available at https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf (rejecting
motion for reconsideration in light of Riley, concluding that Riley does not change the border search
exception and that the court’s decision is consistent with Riley anyway); Kim, 2015 BL 134375, at
*20–22 (concluding that Riley gives courts clear guidance on digital border search analysis); Brief
of Appellant, supra note 27, at 8–9 (arguing that under Riley digital border searches must be
subjected to the warrant requirement); see also LAFAVE, supra note 64, § 10.5(f), at 7–8 (noting that
“Cotterman certainly is bolstered” by Riley but that it is an open question “whether post-Riley courts
will conclude that Cotterman does not go far enough”).
232. See Brief of Appellant, supra note 27, at 8–9; Brief of Amicus Curiae ACLU, supra note 27,
at 2–3; Brief of Amicus Curiae EFF, supra note 27, at 3.
233. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2495 (2014).
234. Id. at 2489–91.
235. Id. at 2484–85.
236. Id. at 2489–91.
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Court also found that the government’s interests in officer safety and
preventing the destruction of evidence with regard to digital information
are not significant enough to justify a departure from the warrant
requirement.237
The Court put technology at the center of its analysis, deciding the
question of “how the search incident to arrest doctrine applies to modern
cell phones.”238 The decision involved two cases and two types of cell
phones: Riley v. California (smartphone)239 and United States v. Wurie240
(flip phone).241 The Court has recognized that searches incident to
arrest—where officers search an arrestee’s person or property found on
or within the immediate control of the arrestee—are reasonable even
without a warrant to: (1) protect officer safety and effectively carry out
the arrest or (2) prevent the destruction of evidence.242 In resolving the
issue, the Court rejected a “mechanical application” of its precedents in
favor of reexamining the doctrine’s applicability in light of the fact that
smartphones and flip phones “are based on technology nearly
inconceivable just a few decades ago,” when the Court decided its
leading search incident to arrest cases.243
237. Id. at 2485–87.
238. Id. at 2484.
239. In Riley, police searched the smartphone of David Riley after stopping him for driving with
expired registration tags. The officer discovered that Riley’s license was suspended and impounded
the car, while another officer conducted an inventory search of the car, finding two handguns hidden
under the car’s hood. The officers then arrested Riley for possession of concealed and loaded
firearms. One officer also searched Riley’s person, discovering a smartphone in his pocket. The
officer began searching the cell phone. The officer noticed some words preceded by the letters
“CK,” a label he believed stood for “Crip Killers,” a slang term for members of the Bloods gang. A
detective at the police station further examined the contents of the phone, looking for evidence, and
found photographs of Riley standing in front of a car they suspected had been involved in a shooting
a few weeks earlier. Riley was ultimately charged in connection with the earlier shooting. Id. at
2480–81.
240. 612 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. Mass. 2009), rev’d, 728 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2013), aff’d sub nom. Riley,
134 S. Ct. 2473.
241. In Wurie, police officers seized a “flip phone,” a cell phone with more-limited features than
a smartphone, after arresting Brima Wurie on suspicion of making a drug sale. The phone received
several incoming calls from a number labeled “my house” shortly after the officers took Wurie to
the police station. The officers opened the phone, saw a picture of a woman and a baby set as the
wallpaper, accessed the call log, and viewed the number named “my house.” The officers traced the
phone to an apartment building, saw a woman that appeared to be the one on the phone’s wallpaper,
and then obtained a warrant to search the apartment. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481.
242. Id. at 2483–84; Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338–40 (2009); United States v. Robinson,
414 U.S. 218, 230–34 (1973); Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–63 (1969). “If there is no
possibility that an arrestee could reach into the area that law enforcement officers seek to search,
both justifications for the search-incident-to-arrest exception are absent and the rule does not
apply.” Arizona, 556 U.S. at 339.
243. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
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Under a balancing test used to determine whether to depart from the
warrant requirement, the Court assessed “the degree to which [the type
of search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy” against “the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate governmental
interests.”244 In conducing this analysis, the Court asked whether
applying the search incident to arrest doctrine to cell phones would
“untether
the
rule
from
the
justifications
underlying
the . . . exception.”245
The Court first identified the government’s interests under Chimel v.
California246 in security and preventing the destruction of evidence.247
To protect these interests, the Court concluded that officers may still
conduct a physical search of the cell phone.248 But because digital data
itself cannot be used to physically harm an arresting officer, the
government has little interest in immediately searching it on the basis of
officer safety.249 Similarly, once the officer has the phone in custody, the
arrestee cannot erase any evidence accessible through the phone. The
Court did consider the government’s argument that digital evidence
could be destroyed by remote wiping by absent third parties, but found
that too distant from the government’s interests under Chimel, which are
directly tied to the arrestee’s attempt to destroy or hide evidence at the
scene of arrest.250 More important, the government can simply prevent
remote wiping by disconnecting the phone from the network.251 Thus,
while the government generally has substantial interests in security and
preservation of evidence at the scene of an arrest, those interests are
significantly lessened with respect to digital information in the search
incident to arrest context.252
The Court then assessed the individual interests in protecting digital
information. In particular, Riley establishes that the “immense storage
244. Id. at 2484–85.
245. Id. at 2485.
246. 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
247. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2483.
248. “[O]fficers remain free to examine the physical aspects of a phone to ensure that it will not
be used as a weapon.” Id. at 2485; cf. supra notes 141–42 and accompanying text (discussing a
“physical device search”).
249. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
250. Id. at 2485–86. “Remote wiping occurs when a phone, connected to a wireless network,
receives a signal that erases stored data. This can happen when a third party sends a remote signal or
when a phone is preprogrammed to delete data upon entering or leaving certain geographic areas
(so-called ‘geofencing’).” Id. at 2486.
251. Id. at 2487.
252. Id. at 2485.
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capacity” of modern cell phones marks a quantitative difference from
other physical items people typically carry.253 The storage capacity of
modern cell phones has several “interrelated consequences for
privacy.”254 First, it collects in one place many different kinds of
information—photos, picture messages, text messages, internet browsing
history, a calendar, a thousand-entry phone book, etc.—that reveal more
information than any isolated record.255 Second, digital information
accessible via cell phones allows a search to reveal information that is
not even stored on the phone.256 Third, data on or accessible through the
phone can date back to the purchase or even earlier.257 Fourth, there is an
element of “pervasiveness that characterizes cell phones but not physical
records.”258 Almost everyone carries around “a digital record of nearly
every aspect of their lives—from the mundane to the intimate.”259
Cell phones also present qualitative differences.260 Internet searches
and browsing history can reveal an individual’s private interests or
concerns, and the location information retained by cell phones can reveal
where an individual has been.261 Cell phone apps manage detailed
information about one’s life, from political affiliation to addictions,
prayer, tracking pregnancy and other health symptoms, planning one’s
budget, and improving one’s love life.262
The unique quantitative and qualitative aspects of digital information
stored on or accessed by a cell phone persuaded the Court to conclude
that searching a phone is even more intrusive than searching a home:
Indeed, a cell phone search would typically expose to the
253. Id. at 2489 (noting that a typical smartphone has a storage capacity of sixteen gigabytes,
which translates to millions of pages of text, thousands of pictures, or hundreds of videos).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. (“The sum of an individual’s private life can be reconstructed through a thousand
photographs labeled with dates, locations, and descriptions; the same cannot be said of a photograph
or two of loved ones tucked into a wallet.”).
257. Id. (“A person might carry in his pocket a slip of paper reminding him to call Mr. Jones; he
would not carry a record of all his communications with Mr. Jones for the past several months, as
would routinely be kept on a phone.”).
258. Id. at 2490.
259. Id.; see also Scott Skinner-Thompson, Outing Privacy, 110 NW. U. L. REV. 159, 208–09,
214 (2015) (discussing Riley’s emphasis on the heightened importance of intimate and political
information, both accessible via searches of cell phones).
260. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2490.
261. Id. (“Historic location information is a standard feature on many smart phones and can
reconstruct someone’s specific movements down to the minute, not only around town but also
within a particular building.”).
262. Id.
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government far more than the most exhaustive search of a
house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive
records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad
array of private information never found in a home in any
form—unless the phone is.263
Weighing the intrusiveness of a digital search against the government’s
interests in officer safety and preservation of evidence, the Court held
that officers must generally secure a warrant before searching a cell
phone incident to arrest.264
B.

The Implications of Riley: Digital Is Different

Riley clarifies an important doctrinal debate over digital searches.
Prior to Riley, lower courts were split over two different approaches.265
Courts debated whether digital information is merely physical evidence
in digital form, such that traditional rules of search and seizure apply, or
something qualitatively different, requiring new analysis under the
Fourth Amendment.266
Under one theory, courts should treat digital files like paper
documents and computers like filing cabinets or containers—mere
repositories for digital documents.267 Thus the government does not need
to specify whether it is searching for digital or paper documents, and
courts look to traditional methods of limiting searches to ensure they are
conducted reasonably—for example, by limiting a search according to
the nature of the criminal activity alleged or the nature of the evidence
sought.268 Perhaps the most significant consequence of this theory is that
officers may broadly search digital information in order to ascertain
what it is269 and may seize any evidence in “plain view” pursuant to a
263. Id. at 2491.
264. Id. at 2484–85.
265. See CLANCY, supra note 47, § 12.4.8.2, at 684–98.
266. Id. § 12.4.8.2, at 684–85.
267. Id. § 12.4.8.2.1, at 686 n.166 (collecting cases); see also U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
supra note 42, at 7.
268. See CLANCY, supra note 47, § 12.4.8.2.1, at 686–89.
269. This supposedly follows from Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976), in which the
Court accepted cursory examination of documents in order to verify which ones were within the
proper scope of the search:
In searches for papers, it is certain that some innocuous documents will be examined, at least
cursorily, in order to determine whether they are, in fact, among those papers authorized to be
seized . . . . [R]esponsible officials, including judicial officials, must take care to assure that
they are conducted in a manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.
Id. at 482 n.11.
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justified intrusion.270 As one court explained:
[Police officers] may search the location authorized by the
warrant, including any containers at that location that are
reasonably likely to contain items described in the
warrant. . . . This container rationale is equally applicable to
nontraditional, technological “containers” that are reasonably
likely to hold information in less tangible forms.271
Analogizing computers to containers rests on the assumption that the
technological differences between them amount to little, so far as Fourth
Amendment doctrine is concerned.
Other courts have instead adopted a “special approach.”272 Under this
theory, the container/filing cabinet analogy fails to account for the
technological differences between digital information and physical
objects.273 Computers offer a fundamentally different system of storage
and information, present unique privacy concerns—particularly in light
of the plain view doctrine—and provide ways in which to minimize the
intrusiveness of a digital search.274 At least one author of a Fourth
Amendment treatise argued ahead of Riley that the special approach has
“no foundation in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, even by

270. CLANCY, supra note 47, § 12.4.8.2, at 684. Under the plain view doctrine, an officer may
size evidence without a warrant if (1) the officer is in a legitimate position to see the evidence, (2)
the officer is in a location to seize the evidence lawfully, and (3) the incriminating character of the
evidence is immediately apparent. See Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 136–37 (1990); CLANCY,
supra note 47, § 7.4.2.4, at 378. The Court has stated the rationale for the plain view doctrine is:
[I]f contraband is left in open view and is observed by a police officer from a lawful vantage
point, there has been no invasion of a legitimate expectation of privacy and thus no ‘search’
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment—or at least no search independent of the initial
intrusion that gave the officers their vantage point.
Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366, 375 (1993). But the plain view doctrine cannot be used to
turn a somewhat limited intrusion into a general search. As Justice Stewart stated for the plurality in
Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971), “the ‘plain view’ doctrine may not be used to
extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last
emerges.” Id. at 466.
271. People v. Gall, 30 P.3d 145, 153 (Colo. 2001) (en banc); see also United States v. Arnold,
533 F.3d 1003, 1007 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Courts have long held that searches of closed containers and
their contents can be conducted at the border without particularized suspicion under the Fourth
Amendment.”).
272. CLANCY, supra note 47, § 12.4.8.2.2, at 689–98; see, e.g., United States v. Comprehensive
Drug Testing, Inc., 621 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc); United States v. Payton, 573 F.3d 859
(9th Cir. 2009); United States v. Burgess, 576 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Carey,
172 F.3d 1268 (10th Cir. 1999); see also Raphael Winick, Searches and Seizures of Computers and
Computer Data, 8 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 75 (1994).
273. See United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 567 (D. Md. 2014).
274. See CLANCY, supra note 47, § 12.4.8.2.3, at 692–94.
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analogy,”275 and that the Court’s prior refusal to rank different types of
containers by privacy interest276 would lead the Court to reject the
special approach for “electronic device containers.”277
The doctrinal debate over how to treat digital information under the
Fourth Amendment formed a major part of the backdrop to Riley and
explains at least part of that decision’s significance.278 In rejecting the
federal government’s argument that a search of data on a cell phone is
“materially indistinguishable” from searches of physical items, the Court
said:
That is like saying a ride on horseback is materially
indistinguishable from a flight to the moon. Both are ways of
getting from point A to point B, but little else justifies lumping
them together. Modern cell phones, as a category, implicate
privacy concerns far beyond those implicated by the search of a
cigarette pack, a wallet, or a purse. A conclusion that inspecting
the contents of an arrestee’s pockets works no substantial
additional intrusion on privacy beyond the arrest itself may
make sense as applied to physical items, but any extension of
that reasoning to digital data has to rest on its own bottom.279
The Court’s categorical language—“cell phones, as a category”—
demonstrates the Court’s emphatic rejection of the view that the digital
information stored on cell phones and computers may always be
searched according to the same rules as physical items. 280 The Court
275. Id. § 12.4.8.2.3, at 692.
276. The Court rejected the proposition that there was any Fourth Amendment distinction
between “worthy” and “unworthy” containers:
For just as the most frail cottage in the kingdom is absolutely entitled to the same guarantees of
privacy as the most majestic mansion, so also may a traveler who carries a toothbrush and a
few articles of clothing in a paper bag or knotted scarf claim an equal right to conceal his
possessions from official inspection as the sophisticated executive with the locked attaché case.
United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 822 (1982).
277. CLANCY, supra note 47, § 12.4.8.2.3, at 697.
278. One scholar wrote in reaction to the decision that Riley would usher in more doctrinal
change:
In a nearly unanimous opinion packed with references to gigabytes, apps, and the cloud, Chief
Justice John Roberts proved that the Justices get it. They get that digital technologies are
different from anything our culture has seen before. They get that people are using those
technologies in a million dynamic ways that were unimaginable a generation ago. And they get
that, in at least some contexts, the Old Rules need to change.
Richard M. Re, Symposium: Inaugurating the Digital Fourth Amendment, SCOTUSBLOG (June 26,
2014, 12:37 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2014/06/symposium-inaugurating-the-digital-fourthamendment/.
279. Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–89 (2014).
280. Id. at 2489 (“Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other
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further noted that advances in cloud computing—which allow users of
cell phones and other networked devices to access data stored
remotely281—underscore the differences between modern cell phones
and physical containers. “Treating a cell phone as a container whose
contents may be searched incident to an arrest is a bit strained as an
initial matter. But the analogy crumbles entirely when a cell phone is
used to access data located elsewhere, at the tap of a screen.”282
C.

Riley’s Relevance to Border Searches

Two federal courts have considered the effect of Riley on digital
border searches.283 They have disagreed over whether the analysis in
Riley applies and, even if it does apply, the extent to which it changes
how courts must regulate digital border searches.
1.

United States v. Saboonchi

Saboonchi filed a motion for reconsideration after Riley, arguing that
the Supreme Court decision changes the digital border search analysis.284
The court denied the motion on two grounds: (1) that Riley “did not
touch on the border search exception” and (2) the court’s previous
decision was consistent with the principles outlined in Riley.285 On the
first point, the court in Saboonchi reasoned that Riley “did not recognize
a categorical privilege for electronic data,” and expressly noted that
other exceptions, such as in exigent circumstances, may still justify the
warrantless search of a cell phone.286 In the court’s view, this indicated
that the Supreme Court did not intend to “exempt cell phones from all
objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person. The term ‘cell phone’ is itself misleading
shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the capacity to
be used as a telephone. They could just as easily be called cameras, video players, rolodexes,
calendars, tape recorders, libraries, diaries, albums, televisions, maps, or newspapers.”). “Cloud
computing is the capacity of internet-connected devices to display data stored on remote servers
rather than on the device itself.” Id. at 2491.
281. See Lon A. Berk, After Jones, the Deluge: The Fourth Amendment’s Treatment of
Information, Big Data and the Cloud, 14 J. HIGH TECH. L. 1, 4–6 (2014) (explaining how cloud
computing allows users of cell phones and other networked devices to access data stored on remote
servers).
282. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (citation omitted).
283. United States v. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d 815, 816 (D. Md. 2014); United States v. Kim,
No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375 (D.D.C. May 8, 2015), available at
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf.
284. Saboonchi, 48 F. Supp. 3d at 816.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 817.
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warrantless searches.”287 The court also reasoned that the Supreme Court
has limited searches incident to arrest with respect to closed containers,
whereas it has always indicated that suspicionless searches of containers
are permitted under the border search exception.288
On the second point, the court concluded that Riley supports the
conclusion that forensic digital searches are qualitatively different from
other digital searches.289 The court acknowledged that the search in Riley
was not forensic, but explained that “the underlying logic in the two
cases is the same.”290 The invasiveness of the search “is only part of the
puzzle.”291 Moreover, the court reasoned, Riley did not change the
government’s interests in national security and immigration and customs
enforcement in the border context.292 Applying the balancing test, the
court agreed that cell phones deserve the “highest level of Fourth
Amendment protection available,” but could not find “a single case”
requiring anything more than reasonable suspicion in the border
context.293
2.

United States v. Kim

The District Court for the District of Columbia took a different
approach in United States v. Kim.294 The court embraced Riley as a
decision giving courts clear guidance that is directly applicable to digital
border searches.295 The court ruled in favor of Kim’s motion to suppress
evidence extracted from his laptop, which federal agents had seized from
him when he was leaving the country at the Los Angeles International
Airport.296
DHS investigators suspected Kim, who had business operations in
California and Korea, was involved in a 2008 shipment of aircraft parts
used in aircraft and missile systems to a Chinese businessman in Korea,
who then sent them on to customers in Iran, in violation of the federal

287. Id. at 818.
288. Id.
289. Id. at 819.
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Id.
294. No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375 (D.D.C. May 8, 2015), available at
https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf.
295. Id. at *20–21.
296. Id. at *1, *26.
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trade embargo.297 The special agent in charge of the investigation
decided to stop Kim the next time he left the country to search his laptop
for evidence in support of the allegation.298 The agent stopped Kim just
before Kim boarded his flight and took his laptop, informing him that he
was conducting a border search and would return the computer once the
search was complete.299 The agent permitted Kim to board his flight.300
The agent did not search the laptop at the airport. Instead, he sent it to
DHS’s San Diego Computer Forensics Group and “requested a border
search of the laptop.”301 The agent in charge of the computer search
created a forensic image, or duplicate copy, of Kim’s hard drive, so that
the agent could read and analyze “every single piece of data on the hard
drive.”302 The agent used specialized software to extract, process, and
identify thousands of files matching keywords suggested by the first
agent.303 The first agent spent “several days” reviewing the files, which
supported the allegations against Kim, leading to criminal charges.304
After the search, the first agent applied for a search warrant to conduct
“forensic imaging . . . and identification and extraction of relevant
data”305—even though, as the court noted, that search had already been
completed.306
Federal prosecutors made three arguments for why the search was
permissible. First, they argued that the search was allowed under Ramsey
because “a laptop is nothing more than a sort of container.”307 This
argument is somewhat remarkable, given the Supreme Court’s clear
rejection of analogizing cell phones to containers in Riley.308 The court
dismissed this line of reasoning on that basis.309 The government also

297. Id. at *1–2.
298. Id. at *1; see also id. at *25 (“[T]he investigators’ sworn testimony to the Court made it
clear that the primary, if not the sole, purpose of the pre-planned encounter at the border was to
obtain the laptop and search it for evidence.”).
299. Id. at *6–7.
300. Id. at *7.
301. Id.
302. Id.
303. Id. at *7–8.
304. Id. at *13.
305. Id. at *9.
306. Id. at *1–2, *26. Both special agents testified that no search occurred after the warrant was
approved. Id. at 26.
307. Id. at *10.
308. See Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488–89, 2491 (2014); supra Part III.B.
309. Kim, 2015 BL 134375, at *23 (“Riley indicates that the Fourth Amendment is not
necessarily satisfied by a simplistic likening of a computer to a searchable ‘container.’”); see also
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argued that the search was lawful either as a routine border search or,
alternatively, as a forensic search supported by reasonable suspicion.310
The court first addressed whether the government established
reasonable suspicion, and found that it did not.311 In particular, the court
concluded that the basis for the search was the agent’s expectation that
the computer contained evidence of past criminal activity, “but there
was no objective manifestation that Kim was or was ‘about to be
engaged’ in criminal activity at the time.”312 With respect to Kim’s
travel, “the search was nothing more than a fishing expedition”—a
factor that distinguished the search in Kim from those in Cotterman and
the recent decision in United States v. Hassanshahi.313
The court then examined whether the search was “forensic,” as in
Cotterman and Saboonchi, or routine. It found that the search “fell
somewhere on the spectrum between the two poles described by other
courts.”314 The agents did not search through deleted files, but they
copied the entire hard drive and could have conducted a more
comprehensive search if necessary.315 The government argued the use of
forensic software was not essential to the search because anyone with
unlimited time could locate the same files.316 Nevertheless, the agents
confiscated the computer, created an exact copy of the hard drive, used
whatever software they determined necessary for the search, and kept a
copy of the data for “a period of unlimited duration.”317 “Certainly no
one simply turned it on and perused the files as might have been possible
at the border.”318
The lack of a clear distinction between a forensic search requiring
reasonable suspicion and a routine border search persuaded the court to
turn to Riley’s balancing test.319 Under Riley, analyzing the
id. at *17 (“[G]iven the vast storage capacity of even the most basic laptops, and the capacity of
computers to retain metadata and even deleted material, one cannot treat an electronic storage
device like a handbag simply because you can put things in it and then carry it onto a plane.”).
310. Id. at *10.
311. See id. at *13.
312. Id.
313. 75 F. Supp. 3d 101 (D.D.C. 2014); Kim, 2015 BL 134375, at *13.
314. Kim, 2015 BL 134375, at *20.
315. Id. at *19.
316. Id. at *19–21.
317. Id. at *19.
318. Id.
319. Id. at *20. The government’s “forensic specialist also acknowledged that the term ‘forensic
search’ can describe a range of examinations and that the term has no specific definition.” Id. at
*19.
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reasonableness of a digital search that begins at the border “does not
simply end with the invocation of a statute or the well-recognized border
exception, as broad as it may be, and it does not turn on the application
of an undefined term like ‘forensic.’”320 As in Riley, the court considered
whether applying the border search exception to digital searches at the
border would “untether the rule from the justifications” underlying the
exception.321
The court reasoned that travelers leaving the country implicated only
the government’s interest in exporting regulations, in contrast to
government interests implicated by travelers entering the country, such
as protecting national security and preventing smuggling.322 The court
concluded that, “while the immediate national security concerns were
somewhat attenuated, the invasion of privacy was substantial.”323
Whatever the line between a forensic and a conventional digital search,
“this search was qualitatively and quantitatively different from a routine
border examination, and therefore, it was unreasonable given the paucity
of grounds to suspect that criminal activity was in progress.”324
The court questioned whether the digital search that took place “can
accurately be characterized as a border search at all.”325 The court noted
that the laptop may have been seized at the border, but it was then
transported 150 miles away to a facility in San Diego, where DHS
copied the hard drive and thoroughly searched the copy over a period of
weeks. 326 DHS found nothing suspicious in Kim’s luggage, permitted
him to board his flight, and returned his laptop to him.327 The actual
search took place away from the border, involved a detailed list of
keywords, and took weeks to complete, while the subject of the search
was allowed to cross the border unhindered.328 For these reasons, the
search “did not possess the characteristics of a border search or other
regular inspection procedures. It more resembled the common nonborder
search based on individualized suspicion, which must be prefaced by the
usual warrant and probable cause standards.”329
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.

Id. at *22.
Id.
Id. at *23–24.
Id. at *24.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *25 (quoting United States v. Brennan, 538 F.2d 711, 716 (5th Cir. 1976)) (internal
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The government initially filed a notice of appeal but later moved to
dismiss.330
D.

How Riley Changes the Digital Border Search Doctrine

The Court has described the border search exception as similar to the
search incident to arrest exception.331 Both exceptions involve situations
where the government has specific heightened interests and the subject
of the search has a reduced expectation of privacy.332 Riley suggests that
courts should reconsider the developing digital border search doctrine. In
particular, courts should consider afresh whether to extend the border
search exception to searches of digital information in light of changes in
technology and societal expectations.333 Would applying the border
search exception to a search of digital information that begins at the
border “untether the rule from the justifications” underlying the
exception?334
The border search doctrine has been traditionally associated with the
federal government’s right to prevent unwanted people and contraband
from entering the country to protect national security, regulate
immigration, and enforce customs restrictions.335 The Court articulated
the doctrine long before the development and widespread use of laptop
computers, smartphones, and cloud computing. Riley recognized the gap
between the search incident to arrest exception and these technological
changes as grounds for reexamining the doctrine.336 After Riley, the time
is ripe for a reassessment to properly account for the differences between
a search for digital information—which may not even be stored locally

quotation marks omitted).
330. Appellant United States of America’s Unopposed Motion for Voluntary Dismissal of
Interlocutory Appeal Pursuant to Rule 42(b), United States v. Kim, No. 15-03035 (D.C. Cir. Aug.
11, 2015).
331. United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 621 (1972) (describing the border search exception
as “like the similar ‘search incident to lawful arrest’ exception”).
332. See Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2488 (2014) (“The search incident to
arrest exception rests not only on the heightened government interests at stake in a volatile arrest
situation, but also on an arrestee’s reduced privacy interests upon being taken into police custody.”);
United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 539–40 (1985) (“[N]ot only is the
expectation of privacy less at the border than in the interior . . . the Fourth Amendment balance
between the interests of the Government and the privacy right of the individual is also struck much
more favorably to the Government at the border.” (citations omitted)).
333. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
334. See id. at 2485; Kim, 2015 BL 134375, at *22.
335. See Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 619; supra Part I.B.
336. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484.
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on the device337—and searches of a person, luggage, or vehicle.
Riley shows courts how to analyze this question. In deciding whether
to exempt digital searches at the border from the baseline warrant
requirement, courts must balance the intrusiveness of the search against
the governmental interests that have traditionally justified the
exception.338 If courts find that the border exception does not apply to
digital border searches, they must revert to the baseline warrant
requirement.339 But even if they find that the exception does apply, Riley
weighs in favor of greater Fourth Amendment protection and a higher
level of suspicion required for all digital border searches.
1.

Individual Interests

Riley is particularly instructive with respect to the individual interests
implicated by digital searches. The decision provides three main
insights.
First, courts no longer have to guess as to the intrusiveness of a digital
search; Riley recognizes there are significant privacy implications.340
Indeed, the Court found that digital searches can be even more intrusive
than the search of an individual’s home—which has traditionally
received the highest protection under the Fourth Amendment.341 This
finding alone would justify the conclusion that a digital search is beyond
the scope of the traditional border search doctrine.
Second, Riley makes it clear that digital searches of smartphones and
computers are categorically different from searches of luggage.342 This
conclusion finally discredits the analogy between computers and filing

337. Some may wonder whether the fact that data is stored in the cloud rather than locally on a
device should result in less Fourth Amendment protection under the third-party doctrine. But see
Ryan Watzel, Riley’s Implications for Fourth Amendment Protection in the Cloud, 124 YALE L.J. F.
73, 73–74 (2014) (arguing that Riley suggests the Court’s willingness to reconsider the third-party
doctrine and recognize Fourth Amendment protection for personal data stored in the cloud);
Shappert, supra note 24, at 13 (recommending that, after Riley, border officials disconnect
electronic devices from networks and obtain a warrant before searching remotely stored data).
338. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484–85.
339. See id. at 2482.
340. See supra notes 253–63, and accompanying text. It would be difficult for courts to argue that
laptops and tablets deserve less protection than cell phones. In Riley, the Court compared cell
phones to computers to illustrate the intrusiveness of searching them: “The term ‘cell phone’ is itself
misleading shorthand; many of these devices are in fact minicomputers that also happen to have the
capacity to be used as a telephone.” Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2489.
341. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2491 (noting that phones contain sensitive records typically found in a
home as well as private information that is not found in the home).
342. See supra Part III.B.
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cabinets—on which Arnold and Ickes expressly relied.343 This finding
should encourage courts to move away from the analyses in Arnold and
Ickes, as well as Cotterman’s acceptance of the search in Arnold344 and
Saboonchi’s conclusion that manual digital searches are similar to
container searches.345
Third, Riley strongly supports applying the same rule to all digital
searches and rejecting distinctions between manual and forensic digital
searches. Riley consolidated two cases, one involving a smartphone, the
other involving a flip phone.346 The Court could have concluded that the
technological differences between smartphones and flip phones should
give rise to different standards, because a smartphone generally has
more advanced capabilities and could reveal more information than the
search of a flip phone.347 But the Court granted both phones the same
Fourth Amendment protection.348
The Court also applied a categorical approach—using the same rule
for all digital searches—because it is easier for law enforcement to
follow and provides greater certainty for individuals.349 Applying a
categorical approach to both exceptions comports better with the Fourth
Amendment’s particularity element, which requires searches to be
limited in scope and tethered to the rationale justifying the initial
intrusion.350 Indeed, the Court rejected several of the government’s
arguments that officers should be able to search only certain information
on a cell phone because such line drawing would be difficult for courts
to administer.351 For example, allowing a search of only information that
was potentially pertinent to the reason for arrest “would in effect give
‘police officers unbridled discretion to rummage at will among a
person’s private effects.’”352 Similarly, allowing officers to search only
information they could have searched if there exists a predigital
analogue “would launch courts on a difficult line-drawing expedition to
343. See supra Part III.B.
344. See supra notes 199–201 and accompanying text.
345. See supra notes 218–23 and accompanying text.
346. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2481.
347. Id. at 2485.
348. See id. (applying the holding to “cell phones,” not “smartphones”).
349. See id. at 2491–92 (noting the Court’s “general preference to provide clear guidance to law
enforcement through categorical rules. ‘[I]f police are to have workable rules, the balancing of the
competing interests . . . must in large part be done on a categorical basis’” (alterations in original)
(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
350. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 (1985).
351. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2492–93.
352. Id. at 2492 (citation omitted).
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determine which digital files are comparable to physical records” and
“keep defendants and judges guessing for years to come.”353
Requiring a warrant or reasonable suspicion for forensic digital
searches but not manual ones would encourage border officials to
manually conduct limitless exploratory digital searches. It would also
lead to inconsistent constitutional protections. In a search incident to
arrest, police would need a warrant to view the last call someone made
on a flip phone. Meanwhile, border officials could manually search
through someone’s smartphone and laptop computer for hours or even
days—so long as it fell short of a forensic search, which could simply
mean the use of sophisticated software—just because the owner of the
devices took a daytrip to Canada.354 As the Ninth Circuit stated in
Cotterman, “[a] person’s digital life ought not be hijacked simply by
crossing a border.” Finally, while it may be true that a forensic search is
more intrusive, Riley indicates that a certain threshold of intrusiveness is
met once a government official has a person’s digital life in hand.355
Applying different standards to forensic and manual digital searches cuts
against the Court’s logic in Riley, neglects the privacy harms of a
manual search, and is unworkable.356
Courts should also consider the burdens on individuals, who have a
legitimate expectation of privacy in their digital information.357 Anyone
who wishes to keep digital information secure would be wise to encrypt
everything, which still does not eliminate the risk of confiscation, or
simply refrain from traveling internationally with cell phones, laptops,
and tablets.358 But the rapid adoption of electronic devices and frequent
travel with them suggest that society is not ready to accept that kind of
limit.359 Riley’s recognition of this practical reality indicates the Court is
not either.360

353. Id. at 2493 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
354. United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 965 (9th Cir. 2013).
355. See id.
356. See supra notes 314–19 and accompanying text; Brief of Amicus Curiae EFF, supra note 27,
at 15–20 (arguing that a distinction between manual and forensic searches of digital devices is
“meaningless and constitutionally unworkable”).
357. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2488–89.
358. See Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 277 (E.D.N.Y. 2013); Givens, supra note 1.
359. See supra notes 28–40 and accompanying text.
360. See Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2484 (“[M]odern cell phones . . . are now such a pervasive and
insistent part of daily life that the proverbial visitor from Mars might conclude they were an
important feature of human anatomy.”).
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Governmental Interests

Riley also provides useful guidance for evaluating the government’s
interests under the balancing test used to determine whether to exempt
digital searches at the border from the warrant requirement.361 It instructs
courts to identify the relevant governmental interests as those that make
up the traditional rationale for the exception, rather than the broader
array of general law enforcement interests the government claims. Riley
also counsels courts to examine the extent to which compliance with the
warrant requirement would burden the government’s ability to promote
its traditional interests at the border.
The government has a wide range of interests and obligations at the
border, but not all of them justify the border search exception. The
longstanding rationale for the exception is based on the government’s
interests in protecting national security, regulating immigration, and
preventing the smuggling of people or contraband.362 The government
urges courts to take a much broader view. As justification for
suspicionless and warrantless digital searches, CBP and ICE assert
interests in general law enforcement.363 Certainly, CBP and ICE officials
are authorized and obligated to carry out a range of responsibilities,
including general law enforcement and cooperation with other law
enforcement agencies.364 But the Court has never announced a broad
governmental interest in general law enforcement as a rationale for the
border search exception.365
Given the intrusiveness of digital searches, courts should adhere to
the more specific interests the Court has used to justify the exception and
resist conflating the statutory authority of border officials with the
traditional justifications for the exception. In Riley, the Court examined
the traditional rationales for the search incident to arrest exception—
officer safety and preservation of evidence—not broad interests in law
361. Id.
362. United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 153 (2004); United States v. Ramsey, 431
U.S. 606, 620 (1977) (“The border-search exception is grounded in the recognized right of the
sovereign to control, subject to substantive limitations imposed by the Constitution, who and what
may enter the country.”); see supra Part I.B–C.
363. CBP DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 5.4.1.2, at 7 (CBP may retain “information relating to
immigration, customs, and other enforcement matters” without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion); ICE DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, § 8.5(1), at 7 (“ICE may retain information relevant to
immigration, customs, and other law enforcement matters” without probable cause or reasonable
suspicion).
364. See Brief of Appellee United States, at 26–27, United States v. Saboonchi, No. 15-4111 (4th
Cir. Nov. 18, 2015) (listing statutory authority of border officials).
365. See generally supra Part I.B–C.
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enforcement or newly asserted governmental interests.366 At the border
there should be some nexus between the search and the interests the
Court has recognized as the basis for the exception.
As part of identifying the relevant government interests, courts should
identify which interests are at stake in the search. For example, in Kim,
the court found that the exit search implicated the government’s interest
in enforcing customs restrictions but not its interests in national security
or general law enforcement.367
As a contrary example, in its appeal in Saboonchi the government
argues that “the purposes underlying the border search doctrine apply in
full force to searches of electronic media, which can contain contraband
(such as child pornography) or material (such as classified information
or malware) that, if illicitly transferred beyond our borders, could pose a
direct threat to our national security.”368 Courts must be more precise.
Certainly, some digital information in the wrong hands could pose a
threat to national security—for example, terrorist plans or certain
classified information. Child pornography, on the other hand, implicates
the right of the government to exclude contraband; it poses no “direct
threat” to national security. Whether malware poses a threat to national
security likely has more to do with U.S. cybersecurity systems and
practices than whether border officials can conduct suspicionless digital
searches. In any case, at least in the Saboonchi appeal, the government
does little to illustrate the extent of these potential threats to national
security.369
Riley is useful here as well. There, the Court rejected arguments by
California and the United States that speculative or unlikely threats
should trump such significant privacy interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment. California and the United States argued that officers should
be able to search a cell phone incident to arrest in case it would alert
them to associates of the arrestee heading to the scene.370 The Court
found there was “undoubtedly a strong government interest in warning
officers about such possibilities, but neither the United States nor
California offers evidence to suggest that their concerns are based on

366. See Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014) (examining traditional
rationales for the search incident to arrest exception); see supra notes 240–52 and accompanying
text.
367. See United States v. Kim, No. 13-cr-00100-ABJ, 2015 BL 134375, at *23–24 (D.D.C. May
8, 2015), available at https://cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/kimruling.pdf.
368. Brief of Appellee United States, supra note 364, at 31–32.
369. See id.
370. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2485.
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actual experience.”371 California and the United States also argued that
encryption or remote wiping could inhibit officers from preserving
evidence.372 But the Court had “been given little reason to believe that
either problem is prevalent.”373 This part of the Court’s analysis suggests
that, where there are significant individual interests that ordinarily enjoy
constitutional protection, the government bears the burden of
demonstrating that its interests should prevail.
After identifying the relevant government interests—national
security, immigration, and customs—courts should examine how
compliance with the warrant requirement would inhibit the
government’s ability to protect those interests. In Riley, the Court
analyzed multiple ways in which officers could secure a cell phone
incident to arrest, obviating the need for an immediate search to preserve
evidence.374 The Court also noted that other needs—such as securing the
scene—suggest that immediately searching a cell phone is a relatively
low priority in the ordinary case.375
Border searches take place in a comparable context because of the
government’s ability to regulate the movement of people and goods. For
example, even with a warrant requirement for a digital search, border
officials could still temporarily detain the device’s owner on the basis of
reasonable suspicion and investigate further, reducing or eliminating the
need for an immediate suspicionless and warrantless digital search.376 To
draw this conclusion is not to belittle the government’s interests at the
border, which are significant. Rather, it is simply to point out that, in
assessing the burden on the government, courts should examine whether
it is necessary for the government to conduct suspicionless digital
searches to promote its traditional border interests.
Courts should also pay attention to the practical realities of the border
context when assessing potential burdens on the government. Given the
millions of travelers carrying electronic devices, border officials lack the
resources to conduct widespread suspicionless and warrantless digital

371. Id.
372. Id. at 2486.
373. Id.
374. Id. at 2486–88.
375. Id.
376. See United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 (1985) (holding that
temporary seizure of individual seeking entrance to the United States was justified by reasonable
suspicion that she was smuggling cocaine in her alimentary canal); cf. Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266, 291 (1973) (describing the government’s power to exclude noncitizens).
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searches.377 They must prioritize. Requiring reasonable suspicion for
digital searches is likely to impose minimal burdens on existing
practice.378 As DHS itself acknowledges, “officers very likely do have
reasonable suspicion in most searches of electronic devices based on
existing screening methods and objective factors.”379 Obtaining a
warrant has become simple and fast, taking less than five minutes in
some jurisdictions.380 Moreover, other existing exceptions, such as
exigent circumstances, would still apply, providing flexibility to border
officials when necessary.381
This is not to say that requiring a warrant (or reasonable suspicion)
would impose no potential costs in efficiency or convenience to law
enforcement. There may be situations where officers have “hard-toarticulate intuitions or hunches” but decline to search an electronic
device because there are no objective indications of suspicion.382 But the
Court in Riley expressed skepticism about speculative or unlikely
reasons for departing from the warrant requirement when such
significant individual interests are at stake. And requiring a warrant
would hardly put digital information out of reach. Under a probable
cause standard border officials would only need to demonstrate there is a
“fair probability”383 that an electronic device contains evidence relating
to national security interests or potential immigration or customs
violations, or that the individual searched threatens the government’s
national security interests or seeks to violate immigration or customs
laws. A reasonable suspicion standard would require even less.384
Moreover, the warrant requirement is “an important working part of our
machinery of government,” not merely “an inconvenience to be
somehow ‘weighed’ against the claims of police efficiency.”385

377. See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 967 n.14 (9th Cir. 2013); U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC., supra note 42, at 4.
378. See Abidor v. Napolitano, 990 F. Supp. 2d 260, 282 (E.D.N.Y. 2013).
379. U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 42, at 17.
380. See Missouri v. McNeely, __ U.S. __, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1573 (2013) (Roberts, C.J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
381. See Riley v. California, __ U.S. __, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2485 (2014).
382. See U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 42, at 17.
383. See Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. 1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 371 (2009).
384. See United States v. Cotterman, 709 F.3d 952, 966 n.14 (9th Cir. 2013) (defending the
reasonable suspicion requirement as a “modest, workable standard”).
385. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2493 (citation omitted).
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Cotterman, Saboonchi, and Kim each made significant contributions
to the debate over digital border searches. But the debate should develop
further. Riley supports reexamining whether to apply the border search
exception to digital searches. Given the Supreme Court’s conclusion that
digital searches can be more intrusive than the search of a home, and are
fundamentally different from searches of a person or physical property,
courts could reasonably conclude under Riley’s balancing test that the
exception does not apply. In that case, they must revert to the warrant
requirement, unless some other exception applies.
But even if courts conclude that the exception does apply, there are
two main reasons why they should require either probable cause or
reasonable suspicion.
First, Riley’s recognition of the intrusiveness of digital searches and
its categorical distinction between digital and physical searches indicate
that courts should treat digital searches as nonroutine.386 Riley’s
application of the same protection to flip phones and smartphones, as
well as its preference for a categorical rule, weigh in favor of applying
the same rule for all digital searches and doing away with the distinction
between manual and forensic searches.387 Moreover, Arnold and Ickes
are based on reasoning that is flawed in light of Riley.388 The Ninth and
Fourth circuits are free to reject those decisions after Riley and at least
extend the reasonable suspicion requirements in Cotterman and
Saboonchi to all digital searches.
Second, after concluding that digital searches are nonroutine, courts
should also consider whether to require probable cause, which will
require a similar form of the balancing test under Riley. Although the
debate over digital border searches has focused on reasonable suspicion,
the Supreme Court has never stated or held that all nonroutine searches
can be justified by that standard. Rather, it has expressly reserved the
question as to the appropriate level of suspicion.389 Lower courts have
generally required reasonable suspicion for nonroutine searches, rather
than probable cause, but they have defined nonroutine searches by their
level of intrusiveness.390 Riley’s recognition of the unique intrusiveness
386. See supra notes 115–25 and accompanying text (discussing intrusiveness as the quality that
marks a nonroutine border search).
387. See supra notes 349—53.
388. See supra Part III.B.
389. E.g., United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 541 n.4 (1985).
390. See supra notes 115–25 and accompanying text.

17 - Miller.docx (Do Not Delete)

1996

12/21/2015 8:10 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:1943

of a digital search supports a probable cause standard.
CONCLUSION
Every year, millions of people travel into and out of the United States
with a cell phone, tablet, laptop, or some other electronic device. These
travelers routinely carry massive amounts of private and confidential
information, from personal correspondence to health or banking
information, intellectual property, attorney-client documents, and
location information. This information may be stored locally, on the
device, or on remote servers, in the cloud.
U.S. border officials search and seize digital information without any
suspicion of criminal activity, on the proposition that digital searches are
no different from physical ones. Until recently, federal courts have
accepted this view. The Ninth Circuit and one federal district court have
required border officials to demonstrate reasonable suspicion before
conducting a forensic digital search. But these decisions still permit
intrusive digital searches that fall short of a “forensic” search, and
impose only the lowest Fourth Amendment standard.
Riley should lead to significant changes in the digital border search
doctrine. Courts should reconsider whether to extend the border search
exception to digital searches, drawing on Riley’s balancing test. Riley
supports the conclusion that digital searches—which can be even more
intrusive than the search of one’s home—fall outside the scope of the
border search exception, which is traditionally justified by the
government’s interest in preventing unwanted people and contraband
from entering the country. But even if courts find the border search
exception applies, Riley should lead them to treat digital searches as
nonroutine searches requiring reasonable suspicion or probable cause.

